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RAIDING THE CONFESSIONAL-THE USE OF INCOME TAX RETURNS
IN NONTAX CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Income tax returns are an essential investigatory tool in the battle against
white collar and organized crime.I The use of the returns to enforce nontax
criminal laws, however, poses serious threats to both the effective functioning
of the taxation system 2 and the taxpayer's right to privacy.3 In 1976,
Congress, attempting to strike a balance between these competing interests,
enacted section 6103(i) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).4 This section
allows the use of federal income tax returns for the purpose of enforcing
nontax criminal laws, while imposing safeguards to protect the taxpayer's
privacy.5 Congress has continued to reevaluate the balance struck by section
6103(i); it is presently considering two proposals to amend section 6103(i)--one
that would afford increased protection of the taxpayer's privacy, 6 and a
second that would increase government access to tax return information.7
Many states, on the other hand, prohibit the use of tax returns to enforce
1. S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 317 [hereinafter cited as Senate Report], reprinted in
[1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3437, 3746-47; Staff of Joint Committee on Taxation, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (H.R. 10612, P.L No.
94-455) 323 (1976) [hereinafter cited as General Explanation], reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 1, 335;
Federal Tax Return Privacy: Hearings Before the Subconm. on Administration of the Internal
Revenue Code of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Senate Hearings] (statement of Judge Harold R. Tyler, Jr.); Coidentiality of Tax Return
Information: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-31
(1976) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings] (statement of Richard L. Thornburgh); Administra-
tive Summons and Anti-disclosure Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1976: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as House Hearings II] (statement of Earl J. Silbert); 126 Cong. Rec. S2374-76
(daily ed. Afar. 11, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Nunn).
2. See New York State Dep't of Taxation & Fin. v. New York State Dep't of Law, 44
N.Y.2d 575, 580, 378 N.E.2d 110, 113, 406 N.Y.S.2d 747, 750 (1978); Senate Report, supra note
1, at 317, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3747; General Explanation, supra
note 1, at 314, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. at 326; Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 200 (statement
of Sen. Weicker).
3. See Senate Report, supra note 1. at 317, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
at 3747; General Explanation, supra note 1, at 314, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. at 326; Senate
Hearings, supra note 1, at 235-36 (statement of Randolph Thrower); Federal Tax Return Privacy:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administration of the Iternal Revenue Code of the Senate
Comm. on Finance, Part II, 1-2 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings III (statement of
Hope Eastman); cf. Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 469-70 (1900) ("The interests of persons
compelled, under the revenue laws, to furnish information as to their private business affairs
would often be seriously affected if the disclosures so made were not properly guarded.").
4. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1202, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (codified at I.R.C. § 6103(i)); see notes
101-17 infra and accompanying text.
5. I.R.C. § 6103(i); see notes 118-26 infra and accompanying text.
6. H.R. 354, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); see note 127
infra and accompanying text.
7. S. 2402, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 126 Cong. Rec. S2377-78 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1980); see note
129 infra and accompanying text.
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nontax criminal laws.8 These jurisdictions have tipped the scales completely
in favor of the taxpayer's privacy, thereby hindering effective state prosecu-
tion of complex crimes. 9 This Note considers whether such an approach
continues to be justified. Part I surveys the various state confidentiality
provisions, focusing on those states that prohibit the use of income tax returns
in nontax criminal investigations. Part II then analyzes these strict state
prohibitions in light of the policies they were designed to serve. Finally, Part
III examines the federal confidentiality provision and the recent proposals to
amend it.
I. STATE INCOME TAX CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISIONS
Every state that imposes an income tax' 0 has enacted a statute that in some
way limits the disclosure of information included on income tax returns, It is
8. See notes 34, 40-46 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 95-100 infra and accompanying text.
10. Ala. Code §§ 40-18-1 to -85 (1975 & Supp. 1979) (personal income tax); Alaska Stat.
§§ 43.20.011 -. 035 (1977 & Supp. 1979) (net income tax); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 43-101 to -199
(1956 & Supp. 1979) (income tax); Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 84-2001 to -2093.7 (1960 & Supp. 1979)
(same); Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §§ 17001-19500 (West 1970 & Supp. 1980) (personal income tax);
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-22-101 to -704 (1973 & Supp. 1978) (income tax); Conn. Gen. Stat.
§§ 12-505 to -522 (1979) (income from capital gains and dividends); Del. Code Ann. tit. 30,
§§ 1101-1243 (1974 & Supp. 1978) (personal income tax); D.C. Code Encycl. §§ 47-1501 to -1595a
(West 1968 & Supp. 1977) (income and franchise taxes); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 91A-3501 to -4616
(1980) (income tax); Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 235-1 to -119 (1976 & Supp. 1979) (same); Idaho Code
§§ 63-3001 to -3088 (1976 & Supp. 1979) (same); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 120, §§ 1-101 to 17-1701
(Smith-Hurd 1974 & Supp. 1979) (same); Ind. Code Ann. §§ 6-2-1-1 to -34 (Burns 1978 & Supp.
1979) (gross income tax); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 422.4 to .31 (West 1971 & Supp. 1979) (personal
income tax); Kan. Stat Ann. §§ 79-3201 to -32,179 (1977 & Supp. 1979) (income tax); Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 141.010-.990 (1971 & Supp. 1978) (same); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 47:21 - :298 (West 1970
& Supp. 1980) (same); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, §§ 5101-5334 (1978 & Supp. 1979) (same); Md.
Ann. Code art. 81, §§ 279-323 (1975 & Supp. 1979) (same); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 62, §§ 1-64
(Michie/Law. Co-op 1978 & Supp. 1980) (same); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 206.1-.532 (Supp.
1979-1980) (same); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 290.01-.975 (West 1962 & Supp. 1980) (income and
excise taxes); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 27-7-1 to -87 (1972 & Supp. 1979); Mo. Ann. Stat.
§§ 143.009-.998 (Vernon 1976 & Supp. 1980) (income tax); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §§ 84-4901 to
-4961 (1966 & Supp. 1977) (same); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 77-2714 to -27,124 (1976) (same); N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 77:1-:36 (1970 & Supp. 1979) (same); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 54A:1-1 to :10-12
(West Supp. 1979-1980) (gross income tax); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-2-1 to -22 (1978 & Supp. 1979)
(same); N.Y. Tax Law §§ 601-698 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1979-1980) (personal income tax);
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 105-133 to -159.1 (1979) (individual income tax); N.D. Cent. Code §§
57-38-01 to -70 (1972 & Supp. 1979) (income tax); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 5747.01-.99 (Page
1972 & Supp. 1978) (same); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, §§ 2301-2385.21 (West 1966 & Supp. 1979)
(same); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 316.002-.802 (1977) (personal income tax); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72, §§
3402-1 to -802 (Purdon 1964) (income tax); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 44-30-1 to -96 (Supp. 1979)
(personal income tax); S.C. Code §§ 12-7-10 to -2790 (1976 & Supp. 1979) (income tax); Tenn.
Code Ann. §§ 67-2601 to -2635 (1976 & Supp. 1979) (income from stocks and bonds); Utah Code
Ann. §§ 59-14A-1 to -1C (1974 & Supp. 1979) (individual income tax); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, §§
5811-5895 (1970 & Supp. 1979) (income tax); Va. Code §§ 58-77 to -151.41 (1974 & Supp. 1979)
(personal income tax); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 71.01 to .55 (West 1969 & Supp. 1979).
11. See, e.g., Ala. Code §§ 40-18-52 to -53 (1977); Alaska Stat. § 43.05.230 (1977); Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 43-362 to -366 (Supp. 1979); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 84-2046(2), (3) (1960); Cal. Rev &
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well settled that state governments have the power to limit the disclosure of
Tax. Code §§ 19282-19289 (West 1970 & Supp. 1979); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-113(4)47) (1974 &
Supp. 1978); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-520 (1979); Del. Code Ann. Lit. 30, §§ 1241-1242 (197S &
Supp. 1978); D.C. Code Encycl. § 47-1564c (West 1968); Ga. Code Ann. § 91 A-3711 (1980);
Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 235-116 to -117 (1976 & Supp. 1979); Idaho Code §§ 63-3076 to -3077 (1976
& Supp. 1979); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 120, § 9-917 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); Ind. Code Ann.
§ 6-2-1-29 (Burns Supp. 1979); Iowa Code Ann. § 422.20 (West Supp. 1979); Kan. Stat. Ann
§ 79-3234 (Supp. 1979); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 131.190 (Supp. 1978); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 47:1509-
:1508.1 (West Supp. 1980); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 191 (1978); Md. Ann. Code art. 81,
§ 300 (1975 & Supp. 1979); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 62c, §§ 21-22 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1978 & Supp.
1980); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 206.465 - .466 (Supp. 1979); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 290.61 (West
Supp. 1980); Miss. Code Ann. § 27-7-83 (Supp. 1979); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 32.057 (Vernon Supp.
1980); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 84-4931 (1966 & Supp. 1977); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-27,119(6)-9)
(1976); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 77:19-:20 (1971); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 54:S0-8-:50-9 (West 1960 &
Supp. 1979-1980); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-1-8 (1978); N.Y. Tax Law § 697(e) (McKinney Supp.
1979-1980); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-259 (1979); N.D. Cent. Code § 57-38-57 (Supp. 1979); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 5747.18 (Page Supp. 1978); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 20S (West Supp. 1979);
Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 314.835, .840, .991 (1977); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72, § 3402-506(c) (Purdon 1964);
RI. Gen. Laws § 44-30-95(c)-(d) (Supp. 1979); S.C. Code §§ 12-7-1680, -1690, -1695 (1976 &
Supp. 1979); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67-131 to -139 (Supp. 1979); Utah Code Ann. § 59-14A-96
(1973); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 5815 (1970 & Supp. 1979); Va. Code § 58-46 (Supp. 1979); W. Va.
Code § 11-10-5(e)-(h) (Supp. 1979); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 71.11(44) (West Supp. 1979-1980).
Confidentiality statutes have been enacted to protect returns associated with other types of
taxation. For example, the governing statutes for most types of taxation in New York
provide for tax return confidentiality. These statutes are similar to N.Y. Tax Law § 697(e), which is
the section governing the confidentiality of income tax returns. Compare N.Y. Tax Law §§ 202
(corporation tax), 211(8)-(10) (franchise tax), 514 (highway use tax), 1146 (sales and use taxes),
1467 (banking franchise tax), 1518 (insurance franchise tax) (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1979-1980)
with id. § 697(e) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980). Some states have enacted one statute that protects
the confidentiality of all tax returns filed with the state. See, e.g., Alaska Stalt. § 43.05.230 (1977);
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 131.190 (Supp. 1978); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 47:1508 - :1508.1 (West Supp.
1980); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. it. 36, § 191 (1978); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 62c, §§ 21-22 (MichielLaw.
Co-op 1971 & Supp. 1980); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 32.057 (Vernon Supp. 1980); N.J. StaL Ann.
§§ 54:50-8-:50-9 (Vest 1960 & Supp. 1979-1980); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-1-8 (1979); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 105-259 (1979); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5747.18(c) (Page Supp. 1978); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67-131
to -139 (Supp. 1979); Va. Code § 58-46 (Supp. 1979); W. Va. Code § 1l-l0-S(e)4h) (Supp. 1979).
Protection is also accorded tax returns filed with municipalities pursuant to their tax laws. For
example, New York City has enacted a confidentiality statute, similar in form to the state's §
697(e), that protects returns filed under that city's personal income tax law. Compare N.Y. City
Admin. Code § T46-78.0 (Williams Supp. 1979) with N.Y. Tax Law § 697(e) (McKinney Supp.
1979-1980). This Note, however, limits its discussion to state income tax return confidentiality
statutes.
These confidentiality provisions are but one class of many thousands of statutes and regulations
that make required reports-reports that must by law be made to government officials-
confidential. In re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 380 (3d Cir. 1976); United
States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 106 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); see 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Evidence
502[02] (1979); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2377, at 780 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton 1961); Comment,
The Required Report Privileges, 56 Nw. L. Rev. 283 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Required
Report]. For example, required reports statutes protect unemployment compensation claims
records, N.Y. Labor Law § 537 (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1979-1980), accident reports, Iowa
Code Ann. § 321.271 (Supp. 1979-1980), and census reports. 13 U.S.C. § 9(a) (1976). The
required reports statutes differ greatly because they are "normally individually tailored to a
particular regulatory area." Required Report, supra, at 285 (footnote omitted), see 2 J. Weinstein
& M. Berger, supra, 502[02], at 502-5; 8 J. Wigmore, supra, § 2377, at 781
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reports, such as tax returns, which are required by law. 12 Absent an express
statutory provision, however, the protection accorded them does not rise to
the level of an evidentiary privilege. 13 Indeed, while some jurisdictions create
such an evidentiary privilege, others merely bar extrajudicial disclosure of the
reports.14
In general, the state confidentiality provisions prohibit state officials and
employees from indiscriminately disclosing state income tax returns."' Thus,
with one exception,1 6 public inspection of any information reported in the
12. See In re Valecia Condensed Milk Co., 240 F. 310, 311-14 (7th Cir. 1917); Featherstone
v. Norman, 170 Ga. 370, 397, 153 S.E. 58, 71 (1930); Roberts Tobacco Co. v. Michigan Dep't of
Revenue, 322 Mich. 519, 529, 34 N.W.2d 54, 59 (1948); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Clendinning,
193 Okla. 271, 275, 143 P.2d 143, 146 (1943); Peden v. Peden's Adm'r, 121 Va. 147, 160-61, 92
S.E. 984, 988 (1917). cf. United States v. Dickey, 268 U.S. 378, 386 (1925) (Supreme Court
assumed that Congress had the power to forbid or allow the publication of income tax returns).
13. See In re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 380 (3d Cir. 1976); Panik v.
Didra, 370 Pa. 488, 490-91, 88 A.2d 730, 731-32 (1952); Peterson v. Peterson, 70 S.D. 385,
386-87, 17 N.W.2d 920, 920 (1945); Agnew v. Agnew, 52 S.D. 472, 480-81, 218 N.W. 633,
636-37 (1928); Peden v. Peden's Adm'r, 121 Va. 147, 160-61, 92 S.E. 984, 988 (1917); C.
McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 112 (2d ed. 1972).
14. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 11, § 2377, at 781; Required Report, supra note 11, at 290-91.
Because recognition of an evidentiary privilege for required reports may impede the "judicial
search for truth . . . [the courts] have historically confined the cloak of secrecy to tile narrowest
scope consistent with the language and subject matter of the required reports statute." In re
Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 378 n.10 (3d Cir. 1976); see Stephenson v.
Millers Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 236 F. Supp. 420, 423 (D. Ariz. 1964); Agnew v. Agnew, 52 S.D.
472, 480-81, 218 N.W. 633, 636-37 (1928); 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 11, T 502(031,
at 502-7:8 J. Wigmore, supra note 11, § 2377, at 781; Required Report, supra note 11, at 287.
15. The information protected by the state confidentiality statutes varies. In some states the
statutes protect any tax return or report filed with the srate. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 40-18-52
(1977); Alaska Stat. § 43.05.230 (1977); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 43-362 to -366 (Supp. 1979);
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-520 (1979); Del. Code Ann. tit. 30, § 1241 (Supp. 1978); D.C. Code Encycl.
§ 47-1564c (West 1968); Ga. Code Ann. § 91A-3711 (1980); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 235-116 (Supp.
1979); Ind. Code Ann. § 6-2-1-29 (Burns Supp. 1979); Iowa Code Ann. § 422.20 (West Supp.
1979-1980); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-3234 (Supp. 1979); Md. Ann. Code art. 81, § 300 (Supp. 1979);
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 62c, § 21 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1978); Miss. Code Ann. § 27-7-83 (Supp.
1979); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-27,119(6) (1976); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 77:19 (1971); N.Y. Tax Law
§ 697(e) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980); N.D. Cent. Code § 57-38-57 (Supp. 1979); Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 314.835 (1977); R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-30-95(c) (Supp. 1979); S.C. Code § 12-7-1680 (1977); Utah
Code Ann. § 59-14A-96 (1974); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 71.11(44) (West Supp. 1979-1980). Other
confidentiality statutes extend protection to any information obtained by the state taxation
department. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 84-2046(2) (1960); Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 19282 (West
1970 & Supp. 1980); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-113(4)(a) (Supp. 1978); Idaho Code § 63-3076(a)
(Supp. 1979); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 120, § 9-917(a) (Smith-I-Iurd Supp. 1979); Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 131.190 (Supp. 1978); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 191 (1964); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 206.465 (Supp. 1979-1980); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 290.61 (West Supp. 1979); Mont. Rev. Codes
Ann. § 84-4931 (1966 & Supp. 1977); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54:50-8(a) (West Supp. 1979-1980) N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 7-1-8 (1979); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-259 (1979); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5747,18
(Page Supp. 1978); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 205 (West Supp. 1979-1980); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72,
§ 3402-506(C) (Purdon 1964); Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-131 (Supp. 1979); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32,
§ 5815 (1970 & Supp. 1979); Va. Code § 58-46 (Supp. 1979); W. Va. Code § 11-10-5(e) (Supp. 1979).
16. Wisconsin is the only state that permits public inspection of information contained In
income tax returns. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 71.11(44)(b) (West Supp. 1979-1980). The Wisconsin statute
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returns is unlawful.1 7 Most states, however, do permit some state officials,
provides that forms containing the amount of income tax reported as paid or payable shall be
made available for public inspection by residents of Wisconsin. Id. The revenue department is
required to notify the taxpayer of the identity of the person requesting the information, his
address, the reasons given for inspection and the information that was inspected. Id. Under a
prior statute, Wisconsin allowed public inspection of income tax returns. 1923 Wis. Laws ch. 39.
The purpose of this "experiment" was "'to prevent persons liable for the tax from concealing
their income and to permit verification of the completeness of their returns.'" Report on
Administrative Procedures of the Internal Revenue Service to the Administrative Conference of
the United States, S. Doc. No. 94-266, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1020 n.691 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Administrative Report]. In 1953, however, the provision providing for public inspection of
returns was repealed and the present provision enacted. 1953 Wis. Laws ch. 303. The "Wisconsin
experiment" produced some undesirable results. The requests to inspect the returns generally fell
into one of three categories: "(1) requests for gossip or perhaps 'prurient curiosity,' (2) requests for
commercial purposes such as mailing lists designed to reach certain economic classes, and (3)
requests for political or scandalous purposes where publicity was desired to damage the taxpayer
in some way, perhaps in some cases by revealing half truths or embarrassing information."
Administrative Report, supra, at 1020 n.691. See also Va. Code § 58-46 (Supp. 1979) (statute
forbids public disclosure of tax return information but governor is empowered to direct that it be
made public).
17. See statutes cited note 11 supra. Some states specifically provide that tax returns are
"confidential." See, e.g., Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 235-116 (Supp. 1979); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 120,
§ 9-917(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47:1508(A) (West Supp. 1980); Miss.
Code Ann. § 27-7-83(1) (Supp. 1979); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 32.057(1) (Vernon Supp. 1980); N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 54:50-8(a) (West Supp. 1979-1980); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5747.18(C) (Page Supp. 1978);
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 205(a) (West Supp. 1979-1980); Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-132 tSupp.
1979). Every state, however, allows the use of tax return information for statistical purposes,
provided that the information cannot be used to identify any individual taxpayer. See statutes
cited note 11 supra. Moreover, some states allow the disclosure of either taxpayer lists or the fact
that a person has filed a tax return with the state. Any disclosure, however, is limited to the name
and address of the taxpayer; other information reported in the return, including the taxpayer's
income and tax paid, is not permitted to be made public. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 43.05.230(e)
(1977) (list of delinquent taxpayers); D.C. Code Encycl. § 47-1564c(c) (\Vest 1968) (same); Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 120, § 9-917(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979) (taxation lists); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 47:1508(BX8) (West Supp. 1980) (same); Md. Ann. Code art. 81, § 300(c) (Supp. 1979) (list of
delinquent taxpayers); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 62c, § 2 1(b)(8) (whether a person has filed a return),
(9) (list of delinquent taxpayers) (MichiefLaw. Co-op 1978 & Supp. 1980); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 290.61 (West Supp. 1979) (list of taxpayers entitled to a refund); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 32.057(2)(2)(b)
(Vernon Supp. 1980) (taxpayer lists); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 77:20 (1970) (whether a person has
filed a return); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-1-8(Q) (1979) (whether a person is a registered taxpayer);
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 205(b)(7) (XVest Supp. 1979-1980) (taxpayer lists); Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 314.840(1) (1977) (list of taxpayers entitled to unclaimed refunds); Utah Code Ann. § 59-14A-96(d)
(1974) (whether a person has filed a return); Va. Code § 58-46 (Supp. 1979) (list of delinquent
taxpayers). But see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-259 (1979) (unlawful to disclose taxpayer lists or
whether a person has filed a return). Many states also authorize the taxpayer or his representative
to obtain a copy of his tax return from the state taxation department. See, e.g., Alaska Stat.
§ 43.05.230(b) (1977); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-113(4)(b) (1973); Del. Code Ann. tit. 30, § 1241(b)
(Supp. 1978); D.C. Code Encycl. § 47-1564c(b) (West 1968); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 235-116 (Supp.
1979); Idaho Code § 63-3077 (1976); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 131.190(1) (Supp. 1978); La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 47:1508(B)(1) (West Supp. 1980); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 36. § 191(2}(A) (1964); Miss. Code
Ann. § 27-7-83(3) (Supp. 1979); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 32.057(2)(2)(1)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1980), Mont.
Rev. Codes Ann. § 84-4931(1) (Supp. 1977); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-27,119(6) (1976); N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 54:50-9(a) (West 1960); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-1-8(E) (1979); N.Y. Tax Law § 697(e)
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other than officers and employees of the taxing agencies, to inspect income tax
returns. 18 In a few of these jurisdictions, any government official is authorized
to inspect tax returns when it is necessary in the performance of his official
duties. 19 Other states specifically identify the government officials who are
authorized to inspect returns. Thus, for example, disclosure of certain tax
return information to the state legislature, 20 welfare department, 2' workmen's
(McKinney Supp. 1979-1980); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 205(b)(1) (West Supp. 1979-1980); Or.
Rev. Stat. § 314.84C(1) (1977); Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-133(a) (Supp. 1979); Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-14A-96(a) (1974); W. Va. Code § 11-10-5(e) (Supp. 1979). It has been suggested that "neither
the State's interest in obtaining a full report nor the taxpayer's in his privacy is diminished by
affording the right to receive a certified copy of his or her own return." New York State Dep't of
Taxation & Fin. v. New York State Dep't of Law, 44 N.Y.2d 575, 580, 378 N.E,2d 110,113, 406
N.Y.S.2d 747, 751 (1978). Three states expressly prohibit the publication of tax returns by any
person. See Ala. Code § 40-18-52 (1975); Iowa Code Ann. § 422.20(1) (West Supp. 1979-1980);
R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-30-95(c) (Supp. 1979). Wisconsin, on the other hand, "does not ... prohibit
publication by any newspaper of information lawfully derived from income . . . tax returns for
purposes of argument . . . or prohibit any public speaker from referring to such information in
any address." Wis. Stat. Ann. § 71.11(44)(a) (West Supp. 1979-1980); cf. Tomlin v. Taylor, 290
Ky. 619, 162 S.W.2d 210 (1942) (newspaper publisher who printed tax return information in
newspaper was not liable for violation of state secrecy statute because the statute prohibited only
state government officials from disclosing information).
18. Disclosure to officials and employees of the tax administration department is, of course,
authorized and some statutes expressly so provide. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-520 (1979);
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 191(2)(F) (Supp. 1979-1980); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 77:19 (1970);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-1-8(F) (1978); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 205(b)(5) (West Supp. 1979); Or.
Rev. Stat. § 314.840(2)(b) (1977); Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-134(a) (Supp. 1979); Wis. Stat. Ann. §
71.11(44)(c)(1) (West Supp. 1979-1980).
19. See, e.g., Collins v. Ferguson, 48 Ohio App. 2d 255, 257-58, 357 N.E.2d 51, 54 (1976)
(construing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5747.18 (Page Supp. 1978)); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-520 (1979);
Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 235-116 (Supp. 1979); Md. Ann. Code art. 81, §,300(a) (Supp. 1979); Mich,
Comp. Laws Ann. § 206.466 (Supp. 1979-1980). See also Or. Rev. Stat. § 314.840(2)(b) (1977)
(allows nontax officials to inspect tax returns only when their duties relate to the administration of
the tax laws).
20. See, e.g., Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 19284 (West 1970) (legislative committee of either
assembly or senate); Idaho Code § 63-3077 (1976) ("duly constituted committee of either branch of
the state legislature"); Md. Ann. Code art. 81, § 300(a) (Supp. 1979) (information can be disclosed
pursuant to a proper judicial or legislative order); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 290.61 (West Supp. 1980)
(abstracted financial data that cannot be used to identify an individual taxpayer can be disclosed
upon a request by the majority of the senate or house tax committee members); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 67-134(e) (Supp. 1979) (for purposes of tax administration, but only upon a lawfully executed
subpoena); Va. Code § 58-46 (Supp. 1979) (disclosure is pernitted to a duly constituted committee
of the General Assembly); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 71.11(44)(c)(3) (West Supp. 1979-1980) (to legislative
committee on organization but only if approved by a majority of quorum of its members and only
if the tax return is disclosed at a closed meeting).
21. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 43.05.230(a) (1977) (in connection with official proceedings or
investigations of the child support enforcement agency); Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 19286.5 (West
Supp. 1980) (returns of applicants for or recipients of welfare benefits may be disclosed to the
director of social services); Ind. Code Ann. § 6-2-1-29 (Burns Supp. 1979) (same); Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 62c, §§ 2 1(b)(9) (disclosure of whether a recipient of public assistance program received
interest authorized to the commissioner of public welfare), (10) (disclosure of a return of recipient
of veteran's benefits authorized to the director of employment security, the commissioner of public
welfare, or the commissioner of veterans' services) (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1980); N.M. Stat.
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compensation department,2 2 municipal governments, 2 3 the governor,2 4 the
secretary of state25 and the state attorney general2 6 is often authorized. Most
Ann. § 7-1-8(M) (1979) (disclosure of last known address of all names certified by the central
parent locator unit as being the names of absent parents of children receiving public financial
assistance); N.Y. Tax Law § 697(e) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980) (disclosure to the department of
social services allowed for purpose of determining the eligibility of applicants for public welfare
and to locate absent parents).
22. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-27,119(6) (1976); N.D. Cent. Code § 57-38-57(4) (Supp.
1979); Or. Rev. Stat. § 314.840(2)(e) (1977).
23. Disclosure of tax return information to political subdivisions of the state is typically limited
to the purpose of tax administration. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-113(7) (1973) (to county
assessor for purposes relating to the assessment of ad valorem tax); Ga. Code Ann. § 9 IA-371 l(c)
(1980) (disclosure to county assessor of amount of inventory and depreciable assets claimed by the
taxpayer); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 131.190(2) (Supp. 1978) (to cities for "official use only"); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 7-1-8(K) (1979) (disclosure of names, taxpayers' identification numbers, and addresses of
registered taxpayers in a municipality to that municipality); N.Y. Tax Law § 697(g) (McKinney
1975) (to cities for administration of personal income tax or unincorporated business income tax
only); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5747.18 (Page Supp. 1978) (names, addresses and identification
numbers of taxpayers who may be subject to municipal tax to officers of the municipal
corporation); Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-134(d) (Supp. 1979) (to authorized official of unit of local
government for the purpose of ascertaining whether proper local taxes are being paid); Va. Code
§ 58-46 (Supp. 1979) (commissioner of the revenue, director of finance, or similar collector pf
county city or town taxes can inspect the returns in the performance of his official duties); W. Va.
Code § 11-10-5(g) (Supp. 1979) (municipality can inspect returns for municipal tax purposes).
24. See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 6-2-1-29(a) (Burns Supp. 1979); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-259
(1979); Or. Rev. Stat. § 314.840(1) (1977).
25. See, e.g., S.C. Code § 12-7-1695 (Supp. 1979).
26. Although a few states do not limit the purposes for which the attorney general may use
the income tax returns, see, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-3234(c) (Supp. 1979); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tiL 36, § 191(2)(C) (1964); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-259 (1979), the majority limit disclosure to cases
arising under the tax laws. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 43-363 (Supp. 1979); Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 84-2046(3) (1960); Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 19285 (West 1970); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 91A-3711(a) (1980); Idaho Code § 63-3076(a) (Supp. 1979); Ind. Code Ann. § 6-2-1-29(a) (Burns
Supp. 1979); La. Rev. Stat § 47:1508(B)(4) (West Supp. 1980); Miss. Code Ann. § 27-7-83(5)
(Supp. 1979); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 84-4931(1) (Supp. 1977); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-27,119(6)
(1976); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54:50-9(d) (West Supp. 1979-1980); N.Y. Tax Law § 697(e) (McKinney
Supp. 1979-1980); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 205(b)(4) (West Supp. 1979-1980); Or. Rev. Stat. §
314.840(2)(a) (1977); S.C. Code § 12-7-1680 (1976); Utah Code Ann. § 59-14A-96(a) (1974); Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit 32, § 5815(a)(2) (Supp. 1979); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 71.11(44)[g) (West Supp.
1979-1980). The power of the attorney general to compel disclosure of tax returns under the latter
statutes has been the subject of litigation in some states. One court has stated that such a
provision presupposes that a tax violation is known to exist. Thus, the statute does not even
authorize the attorney general to direct disclosure of the returns to a grand jury investigating
possible violations of the tax laws. Wales v. Tax Comm'n, 100 Ariz. 181, 183-84, 412 P.2d 472,
474 (1966) (en banc). A Massachusetts court, however, reached a different result. The court found
that that state's confidentiality statute did not prohibit the state Commissioner of Corporations
and Taxation from complying with the attorney general's request for tax returns for the purpose
of investigating possible violations of the tax laws. Opinion of the Justices, 354 Mass. 804, 811,
241 N.E.2d 91, 95 (1968); cf. Losavio v. Robb, - Colo. - , - 579 P.2d 1152, 1156 (1978)
(en banc) (state confidentiality statute does not prohibit compliance with a subpoena issued by a
grand jury investigating possible violations of the tax laws); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Mclnnis,
409 P.2d 355, 356 (Okla. 1965) (same).
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states also permit disclosure to the tax administrators of other states and the
federal government.2
7
In tax proceedings, tax returns enjoy no confidentiality. 28 Thus, many
states specifically permit the disclosure of tax returns for use in court
proceedings arising under the tax laws. 29 In proceedings not arising under the
tax laws, however, the confidentiality statutes in most states prohibit govern-
ment officials from complying with a subpoena. 30 In the majority of jurisdic-
27. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 40-18-53 (1975); Alaska Stat. § 43.05,230(c) (1977); Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 43-364 (Supp. 1979); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 84-2046(2) (1960); Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 19286
(West Supp. 1980); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-113(7) (1973); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-520 (1979); D.C.
Code Encycl. § 47-1564c(b) (West 1968); Ga. Code Ann. § 91A-3711(b) (1980); Hawaii Rev. Stat.
§ 235-117 (1976); Idaho Code § 63-3077 (1976); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 120, § 9-917(c) (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1979); Ind. Code Ann. § 6-2-1-29 (Bums Supp. 1979); Iowa Code Ann. § 422.20(1) (West
Supp. 1979-1980); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-3234(e) (Supp. 1979); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 131.190(2) (Supp.
1978); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47:1508(B)(5) (West Supp. 1980); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 36,
§ 191(2)(D) (1978); Md. Ann. Code art. 81, § 300(b) (Supp. 1979); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 62c,
§ 21(b)(6) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1978); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 206.466 (Supp. 1979-1980); Miss.
Code Ann. § 27-7-83(2) (Supp. 1979); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 32.057(2)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980); Mont.
Rev. Codes Ann. § 84-4931(3) (Supp. 1977); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-27,119(8) (1976); N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 54:50-9(f) (West 1960); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-1-8(A), (B) (1979); N.Y. Tax Law § 697(f)
(McKinney 1975); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-259 (1979); N.D. Cent. Code § 57-38-57(3) (Supp. 1979);
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 205(b)(6) (West Supp. 1979-1980); Or. Rev. Stat. § 314.840(1) (1977);
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72, § 3402-506(C) (Purdon 1964); R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-1-14 (Supp. 1979); SC.
Code § 12-7-1690 (1976); Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-137(b) (Supp. 1979); Utah Code Ann,
§ 59-14A-96(c) (1974); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 5815(c) (1970); Va. Code § 54-46 (Supp. 1979); W.
Va. Code § 11-10-5(f) (Supp. 1979); Wis. Stat. Ann. 71.11(44)(c)(4) (West Supp. 1979-1980). Two
states, however, do nor permit the exchange of tax return information with other states. See N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 77 19 (1970); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5747.18(C) (Page Supp. 1978). The
validity of the reciprocal provisions has been upheld against an attack that they constitute a
burden on interstate commerce. See Dixie Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Martin, 278 Ky. 705, 709,
129 S.W.2d 181, 183 (1939); Roberts Tobacco Co. v. Michigan Dep't of Revenue, 322 Mich. 519,
525, 34 N.W.2d 54, 57 (1948).
28. "To confer a privilege in such cases would defeat the more efficient administration of the
agency that the legislature was attempting to create by enacting the protective provision."
Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence and the Law of Privileges, 15 Wayne L. Rev. 1286, 1304
(1969).
29. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 84-2046(2) (1960); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-113(4)(a) (Supp.
1978); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-520 (1979); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47:1508(A) (West Supp. 1980);
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 290.611 (West Supp. 1980); Mo. Stat. Ann. § 32.057(2)(1)(b)-(c) (Vernon Supp.
1980); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 84-4931(1) (Supp. 1977); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-27,119(6) (1976);
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54.50-8(a) (West Supp. 1979-1980); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-1-8(D) (1979); N.Y.
Tax Law § 697(e) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 205(b) (West Supp.
1979-1980); Or. Rev. Stat. § 314.835 (1977); Utah Code Ann. § 59-14A-96(a) (1974); W. Va. Code
§ 11-10-5(e) (Supp. 1979).
30. Constantine v. Constantine, 274 Ala. 374, 379, 149 So. 2d 262, 267 (1963); see In re
Second Additional Grand Jury, 234 N.Y.S.2d 64, 65 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.
McInnis, 409 P.2d 355, 356-57 (Okla. 1965); State ex rel. Thesman v. Dooley, 270 Or. 37, 45, 526
P.2d 563, 567 (1974). Many of the confidentiality statutes expressly provide that government
officials cannot be required to produce state income tax returns in any court except in an action or
proceeding arising under the tax laws. See statutes cited note 29 supra. But see Don Bullian v.
DeLisa, 246 Md. 734, 737-38, 230 A.2d 349, 350-51 (1967) (state secrecy statute, Md. Ann. Code
art. 81, § 300 (Supp. 1979), did not prohibit comptroller's representative from revealing income
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lions, this prohibition does not create an evidentiary privilege for the tax
returns in the hands of the taxpayer; 31 in fact he may be required to secure a
copy of his return from the state. 32 The courts in these jurisdictions have
noted that the state policies in favor of confidentiality should be a prime
consideration in determining whether to compel a party to produce his tax
records.
33
tax return to judge); Wisconsin Steel Treating & Blasting Co. v. Donlin, 23 Wis. 2d 379, 383, 127
N.W.2d 5, 7-8 (1964) (under state statute, Wis. Stat. Ann. § 71.11(44)(c)(6) (Supp. 1979-1980), tax
commissioner can produce tax returns in a nontax civil proceeding); Va. Code § 58-46 (Supp.
1979) (the governor may direct that tax returns shall be laid before any court).
31. In re Hines, 69 F.2d 52, 52 (2d Cir. 1934) (applying New York law); Constantine v.
Constantine, 274 Ala. 374, 378-79, 149 So. 2d 262, 266-67 (1963); Bailey v. Bruce, 132 Ga. App.
782, 786, 209 S.E.2d 135, 138 (1974); Bianchi v. Pattison Pontiac Co., 258 So. 2d 388, 389-90
(La. Ct. App. 1972); State ex rel. Boswell v. Curtis, 334 S.W.2d 757, 762-63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960);
Schriock v. Schriock, 128 N.W.2d 852, 863 (N.D. 1964); see Losavio v. Robb, - Colo. -,
-, 579 P.2d 1152, 1157 (1978) (en banc) (secrecy statute does not create a testimonial privilege);
DonBullian v. DeLisa, 246 Md. 734, 738, 230 A.2d 349, 351 (1967) (state tax returns admissible
as evidence; question of privilege not considered); Banks v. Macenka, 5 Pa. D. & C. 3d 318 (Pa.
Dist. Ct. 1978) (same). But see Webb v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Cal. 2d 509, 319 P.2d 621 (1957);
Leave v. Boston Elevated Ry., 306 Mass. 391, 28 N.E.2d 483 (1940). The Webb court held that
the California secrecy statute implicitly created a privilege for state tax returns in the taxpayer's
hands. Although the California Supreme Court has expressly refused to overrule Webb, Crest
Catering Co. v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. 2d 274, 277, 398 P.2d 150, 152, 42 Cal. Rptr. 110, 112
(1965) (en banc), that court has noted that "no attempt has been made... to define the full ambit
of the privilege." Say-on Drugs, Inc. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 1, 8, 538 P.2d 739, 743, 123
Cal. Rptr. 283, 287 (1975) (en banc). The lower California courts have begun to define the
parameters of the taxpayer privilege. For example, in Wilson v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. App. 3d
825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 130 (1976), the court noted that the taxpayer privilege was not expressly
created by statute, but was "interpolated" both from the secrecy statute that prohibited disclosure
by public employees and from the underlying policy. Thus, because the privilege was judicially
created, "[i]t is for the courts to interpret [its] meaning." Id. at 829, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 132-33. The
Wilson court held that a taxpayer waives the privilege of confidentiality attaching to copies of his
income tax returns when he files a lawsuit placing the contents of those returns directly in issue.
Id. at 830, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 133; see Miller v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. App. 3d 145, 149, 139
Cal. Rptr. 521, 523-24 (1977) (tax return privilege does not apply in the context of a proceeding to
enforce child support orders made pursuant to the state's Family Law Act when the privilege is
invoked by the defaulting party).
32. See Gould v. Sullivan, 54 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. CL), aff'd mem., 269 A.D. 736, 54
N.Y.S.2d 396 (1st Dep't 1945).
33. See Constantine v. Constantine, 274 Ala. 374, 378-79, 149 So. 2d 262, 266 (1963); Bianchi
v. Pattison Pontiac Co., 258 So. 2d 388, 390 (La. Ct. App. 1972); State ex rel. Boswell v. Curtis,
334 S.W.2d 757, 763-64 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960); Ullmann v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 87 N.J. Super.
409, 415-16, 209 A.2d 651, 654 (App. Div. 1965); Jones Packing Co. v. Caldwell, 510 P.2d 683,
684 (Okla. 1973); Moretta v. Moretta, 100 R.I. 220, 224-25, 213 A.2d 808, 810 (1965). In
Bianchi, the court stated that "because of the confidential nature and personal character of its
contents, the court should be very cautious in permitting [a tax return's] inspection and copying.
Such action should be authorized only after the court is convinced both of its relevancy and
necessity for the prosecution of the plaintiffs' suit." 258 So. 2d at 390. Although the tax returns
are not privileged, the courts generally consider the discovery rules of their state in deciding
whether to compel production. See, e.g., Bailey v. Bruce, 132 Ga. App. 782, 784-86, 209 S.E.2d
135, 137-38 (1974); Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Joanna-Western Mills Co., 53 III. App. 3d 542,
557, 368 N.E.2d 629, 640-41 (1977); Long v. Sledge, 209 So. 2d 814, 819 (Miss. 1968); State ex
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Perhaps the greatest divergence among the jurisdictions on tax return
confidentiality concerns the use of tax information in nontax criminal investi-
gations and proceedings. Many states expressly prohibit the use of
income tax returns in nontax cases. 34 A lesser number of jurisdictions do not
expressly prohibit such disclosure35 and, because confidentiality provisions are
narrowly construed, 36 would appear to permit the use of tax information in
criminal investigations. Finally, the relevant statutes in a third group of
jurisdictions are ambiguous on such disclosure. 3" In a number of these last
jurisdictions, however, it is unlawful to disclose tax information in a nontax
proceeding except in accordance with a judicial order. 38 Such provisions have
rel. Boswell v. Curtis, 334 S.W.2d 757, 761-63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960); Rhodes v. Edwards, 178
Neb. 757, 760, 135 N.W.2d 453, 456, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 943 (1965); Ullmann v. Hartford
Fire Ins. Co., 87 N.J. Super. 409, 415, 209 A.2d 651, 654 (App. Div. 1965); Matchen v.
McGahey, 455 P.2d 52, 55-57 (Okla. 1969); State ex rel. Thesman v. Dooley, 270 Or. 37, 45, 526
P.2d 563, 576 (1974); Banks v. Macenka, 5 Pa. D. & C. 3d 318, 319-20 (Dist. Ct. 1978);
Novogroski v. O'Brien, 106 R.I. 490, 493, 261 A.2d 233, 285 (1970).
34. Aday v. Superior Court, 55 Cal. 2d 789, 362 P.2d 47, 51-52, 13 Cal. Rptr. 415, 419-20
(1961) (en banc) (applying corporate income tax return confidentiality statute which is similar to
the state's personal income tax return confidentiality statute, Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 19282
(West Supp. 1980)); Garrett v. State, 243 Ga. 322, 253 S.E.2d 741, 742 (1979) (applying Ga. Code
Ann. § 92-3216, presently codified at Ga. Code Ann. § 91A-3711 (1980)); Grand Jurors for
Worcester County for Year 1951 v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxation, 329 Mass. 89, 90, 106
N.E.2d 539, 540 (1952) (applying Mass. Laws Ann. ch. 62, § 58, presently codified at Mass.
Laws Ann. ch. 62c, § 21(a) (Michie/Law. Co-op 1978)); New York State Dep't of Taxation & Fin.
v. New York State Dep't of Law, 44 N.Y.2d 575, 577, 378 N.E.2d 110, 112, 406 N.Y.S.2d 747,
749 (1978) (applying N.Y. Tax Law § 697(e) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980)); Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n v. Clendinning, 193 Okla. 271, 274-77, 143 P.2d 143, 146 (1943) (applying Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 68, § 1454, presently codified at Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 205 (West Supp. 1979-1980));
Alaska Stat. § 43.05.230 (1977); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 43-362, -366 (Supp. 1979); Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 84-2046(2) (1960); Idaho Code § 63-3076(a) (Supp. 1979); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 131.190 (Supp.
1978); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47:1508 (West Supp. 1980); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 290.61 (West Supp.
1980); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 32.057 (Vernon Supp. 1980); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 8(a) (West Supp.
1979-1980); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-1-8 (1979); Or. Rev. Stat. § 314.835 (1977); Tenn. Code Ann.
§§ 67-131, -139 (Supp. 1979); W. Va. Code § 11-10-5(e) (Supp. 1979).
35. See Del. Code Ann. it. 30, § 1241 (Supp. 1978); D.C. Code Encycl. § 47-1564c(a) (West
1968); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 235-116 (Supp. 1979); Iowa Code Ann. § 422.20 (West Supp.
1979-1980); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 79-3234(b) (Supp. 1979); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 191 (1978);
Md. Ann. Code art. 81, § 300(a) (Supp. 1979); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-259 (1979); Va. Code
§ 58-46 (Supp. 1979). Moreover, the Virginia statute gives the governor the power to direct that
income tax returns "be laid before any court." Id.
36. See note 14 supra.
37. Ala. Code § 40-18-52 (1975); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-113(4)(a) (Supp. 1978); Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 120, § 9-917 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); Ind. Code Ann. § 6-2-1-29 (Burns Supp. 1979);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 206.465 (Supp. 1979-1980); Miss. Code Ann. § 27-7-83 (Supp. 1979);
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 84-4931 (Supp. 1977); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-27,119(6) (1976); N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 77:19 (1970); N.D. Cent. Code § 57-38-57 (Supp. 1979); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 5747.18 (Page Supp. 1978); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72, § 3402-506(C)(Purdon 1964); R.I. Gen. Laws
§ 44-30-95(c)(Supp. 1979); S.C. Code § 12-7-1680 (1976); Utah Code Ann. § 59-14A-96(a) (1974);
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 5815(a) (Supp. 1979).
38. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-113(4)(a) (Supp. 1978); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 120, § 9-917
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 84-4931 (Supp. 1977); Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 77-27,119(6) (1976); Utah Code Ann. § 59-14A-96(a) (1974).
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in a few jurisdictions been interpreted as prohibiting disclosure in any nontax
criminal proceeding. 39
The dichotomy with respect to the availability and use of tax return
information in nontax criminal investigations is exemplified by the procedures
used in New York and Wisconsin. New York's confidentiality provision, 40
one of the type expressly prohibiting the use of return information in any
nontax proceedings, 4 1 excepts from its ban any disclosure made "in accor-
dance with [a] proper judicial order. '42 In New York State Department of
Taxation and Finance v. New York State Department of Law,4 3 the state's law
department, relying on the judicial order exception and general notions of
interagency cooperation," sought to compel the state's tax department to
produce income tax returns for a grand jury investigation into organized
crime. 45 The tax department's refusal to comply with the request was upheld
by the New York court of appeals, which strictly construed the statute and its
exception:
Absent possible circumstances so extraordinary that they plumb the very depths of
judicial and Grand Jury power, a "proper order" is one which either effectuates the
enumerated exceptions within the statute or which arises out of a case in which the
report is itself at issue, as in a forgery or perjury prosecution.4 6
In New York, therefore, state prosecutors are foreclosed from obtaining
income tax information for use in their criminal investigations. Wisconsin, on
the other hand, expressly permits the use of tax return information in non-tax
criminal proceedings. 47 The returns, however, may only be used if a court
order is issued based on findings that there is reasonable cause to believe that
a criminal act has been committed, that the return information is probative
evidence of a matter in issue and that the information sought cannot rea-
sonably be obtained from another source.
48
39. See Garrett v. State, 243 Ga. 322, 253 S.E.2d 741, 742 (1979) tinterpreting statute now
codified as Ga. Code Ann. § 91A-3711 (1980)); New York State Dep't of Taxation & Fin. v. New
York State Dep't of Law, 44 N.Y.2d 575, 578, 378 N.E.2d 110, 112, 406 N.Y.S.2d 747, 749
(1978) (interpreting N.Y. Tax Law § 697(e) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980)). See also IBM Corp. v.
State, 71 Mich. App. 526, 540, 248 N.W.2d 605, 610 (1976) (judicial order exception interpreted
as simply providing agency employees with a defense from criminal prosecution for unlawfully
disclosing income tax returns in accordance with a court order). But see Losavio v.
Robb, - Colo. -, - n.6, 579 P.2d 1152, 1155 n.6 (1978) (en banc) (court implied that the
state's confidentiality statute would not bar compliance with a subpoena issued by a grand jury
investigating possible violations of nontax criminal laws).
40. N.Y. Tax Law § 697(e) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
41. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
42. N.Y. Tax Law § 697(e) (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
43. 44 N.Y.2d 575, 378 N.E.2d 110, 406 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1978).
44. Id. at 581-82, 378 N.E.2d at 114, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
45. Id. at 578, 378 N.E.2d at 112, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
46. Id. at 582, 378 N.E.2d at 114, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 752.
47. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 71.11(44)(g)(3) (Supp. 1979-1980).
48. Id. § 71.11(44)(g)(4)(a)-(c). It is noteworthy that the Wisconsin provision is identical to the
provision governing the disclosure of federal income tax returns for use in nontax criminal
investigations. See notes 122-26 infra and accompanying text. See also Conn. Genn. Stat.
§ 12-520 (1979) (disdosure of tax returns to any officer or department of the state government when
there is reasonable cause to believe that there is a violation of any state law).
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There are two basic policy considerations supporting confidentiality of tax
information. The primary state policy is to encourage citizens to make
truthful and complete disclosure in their tax returns. 49 When "[a]n attempt to
get [information] by mere compulsion might be tedious and ineffective . . .
and a concession of anonymity . . . meaningless[,] .... it is expedient for the
government to promise to cloak the information in some special degree of
secrecy in exchange for ready and truthful disclosure."5 0 In jurisdictions that
strictly enforce the confidentiality provisions"1 , this proscription against the
use of tax information in nontax proceedings also benefits the filing citizen by
respecting his individual privacy and by reducing the possibility of self-
incrimination. 52
A secondary state policy underlying the confidentiality provisions is easing
the government's "housekeeping" burden. 53 This policy seeks to prevent
disclosure of the opinions of executive officials, to preserve state documents
from wear and tear, and to avoid inconvenience to the state due to repeated
demands for disclosure of tax information. 54 The importance that the state
legislatures attach to both of these policies is evidenced by the stringent
penalties provided for violation of the confidentiality provisions, including
fines, imprisonment and temporary and permanent dismissal from office."
49. See Webb. v. Standard Oil Co., 49 Cal. 2d 509, 513, 319 P.2d 621, 624 (1957) (en banc);
Garrett v. State, 243 Ga. 322, 253 S.E.2d 741, 744 (1979); New York State Dep't of Taxation &
Fin. v. New York State Dep't of Law, 44 N.Y.2d 575, 580, 378 N.E.2d 110, 113, 406 N.Y.S.2d
747, 751 (1978); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Clendinning, 193 Okla. 271, 275, 143 P.2d 143, 147
(1943). See generally In re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 380 (3d Cir. 1976);
United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 107 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra
note 11, 502[02], at 502-5; 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 11. § 2377, at 780-82; Required Report,
supra note 11, at 286
50. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 11, § 2377, at 781 (footnote omitted).
51. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
52. New York State Dep't of Taxation & Fin. v. New York State Dep't of Law, 44 N.Y.2d
575, 579, 378 N.E.2d 110, 112-13, 406 N.Y.S.2d 747, 750 (1978); see Wales v. Tax Comm'n, 100
Ariz. 181, 184-85, 412 P.2d 472, 475 (1966) (en banc) ("[u]ndoubtedly, the Legislature of Arizona,
in requiring that tax returns and reports be kept secret, was fully cognizant of the Fifth
Amendment . . . for it makes possible a variety of criminal prosecutions from information
obtained by reason of an inspection of a tax return extorted under compulsion of law'); IBM
Corp. v. State, 71 Mich. App. 526, 540, 248 N.W.2d 605, 612 (1976) (protection of the taxpayer's
privacy is contemplated by the confidentiality statute).
53. Required Report, supra note 11, at 286-87; see In re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975,
541 F.2d 373, 380 n.14 (3d Cir. 1976); 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 11, 502[021, at
502-5 to -6.
54. Required Report, supra note 11, at 286-87.
55. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 40-18-52 (1975) ($50/one month at hard labor and ineligibility from
holding office as commissioner or employee of the department of revenue); Alaska Stat.
§ 43.05.230(0 (1977) ($5,000/two years); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 43-365, -366 (Supp. 1979) (class I
misdemeanor); Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 19282 (West Supp. 1980) (misdemeanor); Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 39-21-113(6) (1973) ($1,000/dismissal from office); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-520 (1979)
($1,000/one year); Del. Code Ann. tit. 30, § 1241(d) (Supp. 1978) ($1,000/six months); D.C. Code
Encycl. § 47-1564c(e) (West 1968) (same); Ga. Code Ann. § 91A-9932.1 (1980) (dismissal/
disqualification for five years); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 235-116 (Supp. 1979) ($500/one year); Idaho
Code § 63-3076(c) (Supp. 1979) ($5,000/five years imprisonment/dismissal/disqualfication for two
years); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 120, § 9-917(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979) (class A misdemeanor); Ind.
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Most state confidentiality provisions barring the use of tax information in
nontax criminal proceedings are commendable attempts at furthering the
governmental interest in complete disclosure while simultaneously protecting
the privacy of the state's citizens. S6 The existence of such provisions, how-
ever, can be justified only if the policies involved are actually furthered by
application of the statutes. If the provisions are ineffective in furthering state
policy, they do not so much present a double benefit as a double threat they
lull the filing citizen into a false sense of security as to the confidentiality of his
returns while hampering the state in prosecuting criminals for nontax viola-
tions.
11. EFFECTIVENESS OF STRICT INCOME TAX CONFIDENTIALITY
States such as New York that prohibit the use of state income tax returns
for purposes of enforcing nontax criminal lawss7 have created an exception to
the rule that the public has the right to every person's testimony" by
Code Ann. § 6-2-1-29(b) (Burns Supp. 1979) (class C misdemeanor); Iowa Code Ann. § 422.20
(West Supp. 1979-1980) (serious misdemeanor/dismissal); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 47:1508(C) (Vest
Supp. 1980) ($10,000/two years); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 191(4)(1978) (class E crimel
dismissal); Md. Ann. Code art. 81, § 300(d)(Supp. 1979) ($1,000six months); Mass. Ann. Laws ch.
62c, § 21(c) (Michie/Law Co-op 1978) ($1,000/six monthsldisqualification for three years); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 206.465(2) (Supp. 1979-1980) ($1,000/one year); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 290.61
(West Supp. 1980) (gross misdemeanor); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 32.057(3) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (class D
felony); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 84-4931(2) (1966) ($1,000/one yearldismissal/disqualification for
one year); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-27,119(6) (19;6) (felony/$S500/five yearsldismissaltwo year disqual-
ification); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 54:50-8(b) (West Supp. 1979-1980) (misdemeanor/$1,000one year);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-1-76 (1979) ($1,000/one year/costs of prosecution/disqualification for five
years); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-259 (1979) ($1,000/imprisonment at the court's discretion
dismissal/five year disqualification); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 68, § 205(c) (West Supp. 1979-1980)
($1,000/one year/dismissal); Or. Rev. Stat. § 314.991(2) (1977) ($10,000/one year imprisonment/
dismissalldisqualification for five years); Pa. Stat. Ann. it. 72, § 3402-506(C) (Purdon 1964)
($500/three years/costs of prosecution); R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-30-95(c) (Supp. 1979) ($1,000one
year/dismissal); S.C. Code § 12-7-1680 (1976) ($1,000/one year/dismissal/five years disqual-
ification); Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-139 (Supp. 1979) ($5,000/five years/dismissal); Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-14A-96(bX1974) ($500/six months/dismissal/five years disqualification); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32,
§ 5815(b) (Supp. 1979) ($1,000/one year imprisonment/dismissalfive year disqualification); Va. Code
§ 58-46 (Supp. 1979) ($500/six months); W. Va. Code § 11-10-5 (e) (Supp. 1979) ($1,000/one
year/cost of prosecution); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 71.1 1(44)(h) (Supp. 1979-1980) ($500/six months).
56. Required reports statutes "both state and federal, may generally be assumed to embody
policies of significant dimensions." Advisory Comm.'s Notes to Proposed Rule 502 of Fed. R.
Evid., 56 F.RID. 183, 235 (1972); see United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 106 (E.D.N.Y.
1976). This view, however, is not universally held. One commentator discussing required reports
statutes has noted that "in legislative halls when bills requiring such reports are proposed the
need for encouraging frank and full reports looms large to the proponents [of the confidentiality
statutes], but the judges and lawyers who would urge the need for truth in litigation are not
alerted to oppose the privilege." C. McCormick, supra note 13, § 112, at 239.
57. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 686 (1972); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950); Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932); Second Additional Grand Jury v. Cirillo, 16 A.D.2d 605, 607,
230 N.Y.S.2d 303, 306 (2d Dep't 1962) (per curiam), affd, 12 N.Y.2d 206, 188 N.E.2d 138, 237
N.Y.S.2d 709 (1963); In re Amato, 204 Misc. 454, 458, 124 N.Y.S.2d 726, 730 (Sup. Ct. 1953);
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requiring the state taxing agencies to refuse disclosure. Such statutes, how-
ever, may no longer effectuate their original purposes. The continued validity
of the confidentiality provisions can best be analyzed by measuring them
against the four criteria generally used to determine whether a communication
should be judicially recognized as privileged: (1) the relationship sought to be
protected must be one that should be sedulously fostered; (2) the communica-
tion must originate in the confidence that it will not be disclosed; (3) the
confidentiality accorded to the communication must be essential to the
maintenance of the relationship; and (4) the injury that would inure to the
relationship because of disclosure must outweigh the benefits resulting from
disclosure.5 9
The confidentiality provisions would appear to satisfy the first of these four
criteria. The relationship sought to be fostered by the confidentiality statutes
is that between the taxpayer and the government. This relationship is an
integral component of the government's taxing power-a power that is basic
to the ultimate purpose and function of any government. 60 The successful
development of this taxpayer/government relationship takes on added impor-
tance because most jurisdictions have adopted a voluntary, self-assessment
taxation system. 61 Were it not for the taxpayers' voluntary compliance, the
governmental resources expended in administering the tax laws would be
enormously increased. 62 Consequently, the state governments are fully jus-
tified in taking steps to ensure that the taxpayer/government relationship is
sedulously fostered.
The second criterion-that the communication originate in the confidence
that it not be disclosed-is not met. Although a taxpayer may expect that his
tax returns will generally be treated as confidential, 63 he cannot reasonably
expect that his return will not be used for the purpose of enforcing nontax
criminal laws. For example, the federal courts are not bound by the state
Oleksiw v. Weidener, 2 Ohio St. 2d 147, 149, 207 N.E.2d 375, 377 (1965); State v. Antill, 176
Ohio St. 61, 64, 197 N.E.2d 548, 551 (1964); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 11, § 2192, at 70.
59. 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 11, § 2285, at 527; see Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093,
1100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); Morris v. Avallone, 272 A.2d 344, 347
(Del. Super. Ct. 1970); Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 335, 181 A.2d 345, 348 (1962); In re A. &
M., 61 A.D.2d 426, 434, 403 N.Y.S.2d 375, 381 (4th Dep't 1978). See also United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974); C. McCormick, supra note 13, § 72, at 152.
60. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); see James v. Dravo Contracting
Co., 302 U.S. 134, 150 (1937).
61. United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 145 (1975) ("[Ojur tax structure is based on a
system of self-reporting. There is legal compulsion, to be sure, but basically the Government
depends upon the good faith and integrity of each potential taxpayer to disclose honestly all
information relevant to tax liability."); New York State Dep't of Taxation & Fin. v. New York
State Dep't of Law, 44 N.Y.2d 575, 580, 378 N.E.2d 110, 113, 406 N.Y.S.2d 747, 750 (1978)
("self-reporting and partial self-auditing by the taxpayer is relied on by our revenue system'); see
Senate Report, supra note 1, at 318, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3747;
General Explanation, supra note 1, at 315, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. at 327; House Hearings 11,
supra note 1, at 4 (statement of Griffin B. Bell).
62. See New York State Dep't of Taxation & Fin. v. New York State Dep't of Law, 44
N.Y.2d 575, 580, 378 N.E.2d 110, 113, 406 N.Y.S.2d 747, 750 (1978).
63. See Administrative Report, supra note 16, at 828-29.
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confidentiality statutes, 64 nor are they likely to recognize the privilege created
by those statutes as part of the federal common law of privileges. 6S Because
64. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 468 F. Supp. 575, 577-78 (N.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 607
F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Shamster, 79 Cr. 546 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1979)
(confidentiality statute in New York Corporate Tax Law did not bar the disclosure of corporate
tax returns for possible use in a federal criminal trial); In re New York State Sales Tax Records,
382 F. Supp. 1205, 1206 (W.D.N.Y. 1974) (confidentiality statute in New York State Sales Tax
Law did not bar production of sales tax returns to a federal grand jury); cf. United States v. King,
73 F.R.D. 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (confidentiality statute in New York City Personal Income Tax
Law did not bar production of personal income tax return for use in a federal criminal trial). In
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, a federal grand jury investigating organized crime activities
subpoenaed several personal income tax returns from the New York State Department of
Taxation and Finance. 468 F. Supp. at 575-76. The department moved to quash the subpoena,
asserting that compliance would contravene § 697(e) of the New York Tax Law. Id. at 576. The
court denied the department's motion to quash notwithstanding its finding that § 697(e) did
prohibit compliance with the subpoena. Id. at 576-77; see N.Y. Tax Law § 697(e) (McKinney
Supp. 1979-1980). The court held that the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution
mandated that the state secrecy statute yield to the federal grand jury power. 468 F. Supp. at
577-78; see U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2. A similar result has been reached when other state-created
privileges were at issue. See, e.g., United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1372 (2d Cir. 1978)
rev'd on other grounds, 100 S. Ct. 1108 (1980) (New York statute prohibiting the disclosure of
statements made on application for unemployment benefits does not bar the production of the
statements for use in a federal criminal prosecution); In re Special April 1977 Grand Jury, 581
F.2d 589, 592-93 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978) (Illinois statute did not preclude
the production of state attorney general's records before a federal grand jury); In re Grand Jury
Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 377 (3d Cir. 1976) (rule of court that retainer agreements
are privileged did not bar compliance with federal grand jury subpoena); United States v.
Thorne, 467 F. Supp. 938, 940-41 (D. Conn. 1979) (state statute prohibiting the disclosure of
arrest and court records in cases that culminate in not guilty findings does not bar the production
of court records pursuant to a federal subpoena); United States v. Blasi, 462 F. Supp. 373, 374
(M.D. Ala. 1979) (motion of Alabama Director of Industrial Relations to quash a grand jury
subpoena directed at documents privileged by state statute was denied); SEC v. First Tenn.
Bank, 445 F. Supp. 1341, 1344 (W.D. Tenn. 1978) (SEC subpoena upheld notwithstanding a
state statute that prohibited a fiduciary from disclosing financial records absent either the
customer's consent or a demand served on the customer). The same has been true even when the
privilege is created by the state's constitution. See United States v. Gillock, 100 S. Ct. 1185, 1190
(1980) (state constitutional speech or debate privilege does not create a privilege in federal courts
for state legislators); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577, 582 (3d Cir. 1977) (same);
United States v. Craig, 537 F.2d 957, 958 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (same), cert. denied, 429 U.S 999
(1976).
65. Although the confidentiality statutes are not controlling, the federal courts can recognize a
federal common law for privileges under Federal Rule of Evidence 501. Fed. R. Evid. S01. This
rule provides that the federal common law of privileges governs in federal criminal prosecutions.
Id. Rule 501, however, is intended to give the courts a "flexible standard" with which to develop
the federal common law of privileges on a case-by-case basis. United States v. Gillock, 100 S. Ct.
1185, 1190 (1980); Trammel v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 906, 911 (1980); In re Grand Jury
Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d
1362, 1366 (8th Cir. 1975); Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236, 238 n.4 (9th Cir. 1975); United
States v. King, 73 F.RtD. 103, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal
Evidence § 201, at 411-12 (1972); 2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra note 11, 1 501[02], at
501-20.4-.5; Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial Privileges Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence: A Suggested Approach, 64 Geo. L.J. 613, 645-46 (1976). Two federal courts, however,
have declined to recognize a state required reports privilege as a federal common law
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state returns have been used in federal criminal investigations 66 it is at least
arguable that an expectation of confidentiality is not in fact reasonable.
Even if the federal courts were to recognize a federal common law
privilege, the confidentiality statutes could not withstand the scrutiny de-
manded by the third privilege criterion. The privilege accorded to state
officials to refuse to disclose tax returns for purposes of enforcing nontax
criminal laws is not essential to the maintenance of the taxpayer/government
relationship. The confidentiality statutes do not foster their primary objective
of encouraging honest reporting on state income tax returns. 67 Confidentiality
per se is not essential to the advancement of honest reporting; most states rely
primarily on other methods to achieve this goal. 68 These include civil and
criminal sanctions for failing to file returns or for filing returns that are
incomplete, 69 cooperation with other taxing authorities 70 and techniques for
privilege. See In re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1976); United
States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). In King, a federal prosecutor issued a subpoena
duces tecum directing the New York City Department of Finance to furnish certain New York
City income tax returns. The city, contending that a provision in the New York City Administra-
tive Code prohibited compliance, moved to quash the subpoena. Id. at 104. The New York
City confidentiality statute at issue in King is similar in form to New York State's, See note 11
supra. Judge Weinstein denied the motion to quash the subpoena, stating that "[wie cannot accept
the contention that the important federal interests at stake are to be sacrificed in order to avoid,
at most, an insignificant adverse impact on a state policy that is, at best, marginally served by the
local statutory scheme." 73 F.R.D. at 109. Although neither court decided that federal courts will
never recognize a federal common law privilege for state required reports, it is unlikely that they
will do so. This conclusion is further supported by the recent Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Gillock, 100 S. Ct. 1185 (1980). In that case, the Supreme Court declined to recognize a
federal common law privilege for state legislatures. Id. at 1190. The case indicates the strong
policy in the federal courts that favors the admissibility of evidence, and consequently disfavors
the creation of privileges. See also Trammel v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 906, 911 (1980); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974); In re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541
F.2d 373, 382 (3d Cir. 1976); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 11, § 2192, at 73. This is especially true in
a criminal prosecution. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
66. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 468 F. Supp. 575 (N.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 607
F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Shamster, 79 Cr 546 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1979); In re
New York Sales Tax Records, 383 F. Supp. 1205 (W.D.N.Y. 1974); cf. United States v. King, 73
F.R.D. 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (New York City personal income tax returns).
67. See notes 49-50 supra and accompanying text.
68. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 468 F. Supp. 575, 577 (N.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed,
607 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); cf. In
re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 377, 380 (3d Cir. 1976) (disciplinary
proceedings and judicial refusal to enforce unfiled retainer agreements were two effective means,
other than a privilege provision, that could ensure compliance with a court rule requiring that
retainer agreements be filed with the court). In King, Judge Weinstein took judicial notice that
"criminal statutes, cooperation with other taxing authorities and techniques for withholding taxes
at the source .... are immeasurably more effective than are privilege provisions." 73 F.R.D. at
108.
69. For example, in New York a willful attempt to evade tax, failure to file a return or the
filing of a fraudulent return is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine not to exceed $5,000, or
imprisonment not to exceed one year, or both, at the discretion of the court. N.Y. Tax Law
§ 695(a) (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1979-1980).
70. Most states permit other states to inspect income tax returns for the purpose of adminis-
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withholding taxes. " Thus, the promise of an ironclad prohibition against
disclosure is at best a peripheral inducement to honest reporting. 2 Even if the
confidentiality statutes were more than a peripheral inducement, it is not clear
that the state's promise of confidentiality does in practice induce honest
reporting. In analyzing this speculative policy rationale,"7 an examination of
the effect of increased federal income tax return confidentiality is instructive.
In 1976, Congress dramatically increased the degree of confidentiality ac-
corded to federal income tax returns.7 4 Many proponents of the change
predicted that the increased confidentiality would benefit the tax administra-
tion system because more honest reporting by the taxpayers would be encour-
aged. 75 The anticipated result, however, has not occurred; to the contrary,
voluntary compliance has actually decreased.7 6 Thus, there is no guarantee
that increased confidentiality will result in increased candor on state income
tax returns.
When analyzing the state confidentiality statutes' effect on voluntary com-
pliance with the tax laws, it is also important to understand the nature of the
information protected. In many cases, state income tax returns require
essentially the same information as federal income tax returns.7 7 Because the
IRC expressly authorizes the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to disclose
federal income tax returns for purposes of enforcing federal nontax criminal
statutes,78 a taxpayer would be unlikely to report potentially damaging
information in his federal return. Consequently, because of the similarities
between the state and federal forms, the taxpayer will be likely to file
incomplete returns with the state as well.7 9 Finally, because state income tax
tering their tax laws. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. Similarly, the IRS is permitted to
allow states to inspect federal income tax returns. See note 110 infra and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., N.Y. Tax Law §§ 671-678 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1979-1980).
72. See United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
73. Id. at 109; cf. In re Grand Jury Impaneled Jan. 21, 1975, 541 F.2d 373, 383 (3d Cir.
1976) (rationale that court rule making required reports privileged encouraged honest reporting
was "speculative").
74. See notes 101-26 infra and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Administrative Report, supra note 16, at 943, 1022; Senate Hearings, supra
note 1, at 200, 228, 235, 238 (statements of Sen. Lowell P. Weicker and former IRS commission-
ers Mortimer M. Caplin, Sheldon S. Cohen, & Randolph W. Thrower); House Hearings, supra
note 1, at 134 (statement of Sheldon S. Cohen, former IRS Commissioner). Mr. Cohen, referring
to a case in which a criminal defendant's tax returns were used against him, stated that "[alfter
all, Mr. Garner did pay his tax. The next time around Mr. Garner will not pay his tax." Id.
76. 126 Cong. Rec. S2375 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Nunn). See also Letter
from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to Allen R. Voss, reprinted in Comptroller General
of the United States, Disclosure and Summons Provisions of 1976 Tax Reform Act-Privacy
Gains With Unknown Law Enforcement Effects 44 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comptroller
General's Report] ("we believe that the disclosure provisions have had no direct effect on our
enforcement of the tax laws").
77. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 103, 114, 120 (statements of Daniel G. Smith,
Secretary and Chairman, Committee on State-Federal Legislature and Administrative Matters,
National Association of Tax Administrators); Brief for Appellant at 16, In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, 607 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1979).
78. See notes 118-26 infra and accompanying text.
79. See In re Hines, 69 F.2d 52, 53 (2d Cir. 1934) ("The [tax return] information given to (the
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returns are subject to subpoena in federal criminal investigations,80 any
protection accorded to the returns by the state that might arguably encourage
honest reporting is rendered ineffectual because of the availability of the tax
returns to federal law enforcement authorities. 8 1
Just as the state policy in favor of honest reporting is not furthered by the
maintenance of the privilege, neither is the state policy in favor of taxpayer
privacy" substantially furthered. Although the privacy concern is well
founded-a tax return provides a skeletal financial and personal profile of the
taxpayer 83 -the privacy of only a few taxpayers would be intruded upon by
the use of state income tax returns in nontax criminal investigations. 84
federal and New York] governments is substantially the same. No greater confidence is placed in
one than in the other." (emphasis added)); United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 108-09
(E.D.N.Y. 1976) ("Since the requirement to file state and city tax returns is similar to the federal
revenue provisions, a scheme to evade federal taxes by filing false returns . . . would almost
necessarily include consistent action concerning state and city returns."). The likelihood that the
taxpayer will fail to report incriminating data on both federal and state returns is increased
because the state and federal governments share tax return information. See note 27 supra and
accompanying text; note 110 infra and accompanying text. Thus, if the taxpayer fails to report
incriminating data on his federal return, but, relying on the state confidentiality provision, reports
that same information on his state return, his chances of being prosecuted for federal income tax
evasion are increased.
80. See notes 64-65 supra and accompanying text.
81. Brief for Amicus Curiae at 5, New York State Dep't of Taxation & Fin. v. New York
State Dep't of Law, 44 N.Y.2d 575, 378 N.E.2d 110, 406 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1978) ("There Is no
societal benefit to be obtained by maintaining that New York State tax records are immune from
grand jury subpoena in state criminal investigations, when they are subject to subpoena in federal
criminal investigations. Certainly the additional disclosure in state criminal investigations would
not significantly alter the situation so as to deter from candid revelations those taxpayers who
would be undeterred by the availability of federal grand jury subpoenas.').
82. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
83. See Administrative Report, supra note 16, at 827. One observer has stated that a tax
return "is a confessional, and in that respect maybe we ought to treat it as a confessional." Senate
Hearings, supra note 1, at 235 (statement of Sheldon S. Cohen, former IRS Commissioner). See
also Boskee v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 470 (1900).
84. See House Hearings, supra note 1, at 27 (statement of Richard L. Thornburgh) (use of
federal income tax returns to aid in the prosecution" of official corruption and white collar crime
affects .007% of all returns filed); House Hearings II, jupra note 1, at 39 (statement of Jay
Waldman) (the use of federal income tax returns in nontax criminal investigations does not
implicate a "mass privacy question'). It is arguable that the exceptions to the nondisclosure rule
set out in the state confidentiality statutes detract from the policy goals set by the legislatures. In
some states, however, the exceptions in the statute are related to the administration of the tax
laws, or relate to the eligibility for aid voluntarily solicited from the state. Thus, the disclosure
can be said to have a voluntary character. See New York State Dep't of Taxation & Fin. v. New
York State Dep't of Law, 44 N.Y.2d 575, 580-81, 378 N.E.2d 110, 113-14, 406 N.Y.S.2d 747,
751 (1978). State courts have also recognized that the privilege accorded state income tax returns
is not absolute. The exceptions recognized by those courts, however, have occurred when the
taxpayer waived the confidentiality of the returns, see Wilson v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. App. 3d
825, 830, 134 Cal. Rptr. 130, 133 (1976) (privilege waived when taxpayer files a lawsuit placing
the contents of his tax returns directly in issue); Strycker's Bay Apts., Inc. v. Walsh, 67 Misc. 2d
134, 137, 323 N.Y.S.2d 563, 566-67 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (disclosure of housing project residents'
income tax returns was permitted solely on the ground that the residents waived any right to
confidentiality by residing in publicly aided housing that was subject to income requirements), or
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Moreover, if the tax returns were not available, the same information could
be obtained from other sources, the only difference being the added burden to
the government.85 Thus, any intrusion into a taxpayer's privacy that would
be occasioned by the use of state tax returns for nontax criminal investigations
would be minimal.
The third policy that prompted the passage of the confidentiality statutes
was the legislative concern with the taxpayers' right to be free from self-
incrimination.8 6 This concern arose because tax returns were, and continue to
be, compelled from the taxpayer by the government, 87 thereby raising the
possibility of a fifth amendment violation. 8  This issue was squarely faced by
the Supreme Court in Garner v. United States.8 9 In Garner, the defendant
contended that the use of his federal tax returns as evidence against him in a
nontax criminal prosecution violated his fifth amendment rights.90 The Court
held that a person who invokes a fifth amendment privilege as to his tax
return must do so when he files the return-the privilege may not be claimed
once the potentially incriminating information has been disclosed. 91 It ap-
a clearly superior state policy was implicated. See Miller v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. App. 3d 145,
149, 139 Cal. Rptr. 521, 523 (1977) (public policy of enforcing child support obligations). It is
noteworthy that the Miller court found evidence of the strong policy in one of the exceptions set
out in California's tax return confidentiality statute. Id. at 148-49, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
85. For example, the information contained on a tax return could be obtained from bank
records, payroll records, and accountant's records. House Hearings, supra note 1, at 29 (state-
ment of Richard L. Thornburgh). If the government were forced to rely on these sources,
however, it would be required to canvass large numbers of financial institutions, a "cumbersome,
inartful, and expensive" procedure. Id. at 28; see 126 Cong. Rec. S2380 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1980).
86. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
87. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 652 (1976); Wales v. Tax Comm'n, 100 Ariz. 181,
185, 412 P.2d 472, 475 (1966) (en banc); New York State Dep't of Taxation & Fin. v. New York
State Dep't of Law, 44 N.Y.2d 575, 580, 378 N.E.2d 110, 113, 406 N.Y.S.2d 747, 750-51 (1978).
88. U.S. Const. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides in relevant part that "[nlo person
.shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Id. Generally, this
amendment protects a person from being compelled to give testimony that may tend to
incriminate him. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924). The privilege encompasses not
only answers that would in themselves support a conviction but also protects answers that would
"furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute [a person] for a federal crime."
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); see United States v. Yurasovich, 580 F.2d
1212, 1215 (3d Cir. 1978). The amendment "reflects recognition that the American system of
criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial." Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964); see
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961).
89. 424 U.S. 648 (1976).
90. Id. at 650. Garner was accused of taking part in a conspiracy to use interstate
transportation and communication facilities to "fix" sporting contests. Id. at 649.
91. Id. at 665. The fifth amendment privilege, however, does not excuse "one's duty to file a
tax return." United States v. Edelson, 604 F.2d 232, 234 (3d Cir. 1979); see Garner v. United
States, 424 U.S. at 650; United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263-64 (1927). On the other
hand, the Supreme Court has recognized a limited exception to this rule when tax returns are
required to be filed by those " 'inherently suspect of criminal activities.' " 424 U.S. at 660. see
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 52 (1968) (the fifth amendment is a valid defense in a
prosecution for the failure to register as a gambler and pay related occupational and gambling
excise taxes); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 64 (1968) (same). See also Mackey v. United
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pears, therefore, that the fifth amendment, applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment, 9 2 is not violated by use of the state tax returns in
nontax prosecutions. 93 It is also noteworthy that a taxpayer's fifth amendment
rights are not completely emasculated by the use of the returns to enforce
nontax criminal laws-he is afforded the opportunity to claim the privilege
when he files his return. 94
When the prohibition against the use of state income tax returns for the
purpose of enforcing criminal laws is analyzed in light of the third criterion,
therefore, it is apparent that the privilege is not essential to encourage honest
reporting, affords minimal protection to the taxpayer's privacy and allows the
taxpayer a second opportunity to assert fifth amendment rights. The legisla-
tive concern with these policies, however, begins to pale when balanced,
under the fourth criterion, against the benefits to be deprived from the use of
the returns in other investigations. The importance of tax return information
in the fight against organized and white collar crime, public corruption and
narcotics trafficking has been frequently emphasized. 95 The information is
States, 401 U.S. 667, 668-75 (1971) (plurality held that Marchetti and Grosso were not to be
applied retroactively). One who files a return and asserts the fifth amendment privilege to protect
his refusal to answer questions on it, "should confine that use to specific objections to particular
questions on the return for which a valid claim of privilege exists." United States v. Edelson, 604
F.2d 232, 234 (3d Cir. 1979). Moreover, the validity of the fifth amendment claim must be
demonstrated to the court. Id. at 234-35; United States v. Irwin, 561 F.2d 198, 201 (10th Cir.
1977); State v. Spurgeon, 200 Neb. 719, 723, 265 N.W.2d 224, 226 (1978) (quoting State v.
Soester, 199 Neb. 477, 479, 259 N.W.2d 921, 923 (1977)). Thus, the courts have rejected fifth
amendment claims made by "citizens [who] have placed themselves in open defiance of the
Internal Revenue Code." United States v. Edelson, 604 F.2d 232, 233 (3d Cir. 1979) (tax
return contained only identifying data with the balance of the requested information answered
with assertions of fifth amendment privilege); see United States v. Irwin, 561 F.2d 198, 200 (10th
Cir. 1977) (taxpayer filed tax return with his name, address, and an entry indicating that he was
entitled to a refund of $4,694; all other questions were answered "Object-Self-incrimination");
State v. Baker, 201 Neb. 579, 580 270 N.W.2d 922, 923 (1978) (taxpayer reported only his name,
address, tax withheld and a claim for a refund on income tax return); State v. Stoner, 201 Neb.
664, 664, 271 N.W.2d 348, 349 (1978) (taxpayer reported only his name, address, town, and
social security number and objected to all other questions including his zip code, and the county
of residence). Valid fifth amendment claims, however, can be made as to the source of income.
United States v. Paepke, 550 F.2d 385, 390 (7th Cir. 1977). It has also been suggested that a
taxpayer could even decline to report the amount of his income. Id. at 394 (Tone, J., concurring).
Such a claim, however, would not excuse the failure to pay the tax on the unreported Income.
Note, Internal Revenue Form 1040 and the Fifth Amendment: Self-Reporting or Self-
Incrimination, the Taxpayer's Dilemma, 54 N.D.L. Rev. 213, 227 (1977).
92. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1964); see Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
93. Keener v. People, - Colo. -, -, 572 P.2d 463, 465 (1977) (en banc) (concurring
opinion); cf. Murray Mortgage Investors v. Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co., - Colo. App..,..
594 P.2d 583, 584-85 (1978) (when witness furnished documents to the IRS for the purpose of
establishing tax liability, he waived any fifth amendment privilege with respect to those
documents).
94. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
95. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 317, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
3746-47; General Explanation, supra note 1, at 323, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. at 335; see, e.g.,
Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 61-80 (statement of Judge Harold R. Tyler, Jr.); House
Hearings, supra note 1, at 26-31 (statement of Richard L. Thornburgh); 126 Cong. Rec. S2374-77
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necessary because "complex crimes are difficult ... to detect as there are
seldom any innocent bystanders to witness the offenses and the victims, who
may comprise a significant sector of the population, are usually unaware that
they have been victimized. '96 Thus, tax return information is essential to
establish the occurrence of a crime. 9" For example, fictitious transactions are
often used to disguise the illegal payments associated with illegal schemes. To
pierce that disguise, the government must compile a complete financial profile
of all suspected participants in the scheme. Tax returns provide a starting
point for those profiles. 98 Although this information is available from other
sources, 99 special problems attend its collection. For example, attempts to
gather the information from another source could alert the subject of the
government's investigation, giving him the opportunity to destroy other
evidence or in some way obstruct the investigation. 100 The usefulness of this
information clearly outweighs any negligible impact on the state policies that
support the prohibitions against the use of tax returns for the purpose of
enforcing nontax criminal laws. Consequently, New York and states with
similar provisions should adopt a statute that will strike a balance between
the policies underlying the confidentiality provisions and the usefulness of the
returns in enforcing nontax criminal statutes. Such a statute has recently been
adopted by the federal government.
IT[. FEDERAL INCOME TAX CONFIDENTIALITY
Prior to 1976, federal income tax returns and tax return information were
treated as a "generalized governmental asset."' 0 1 Although public disclosure
of tax returns was prohibited, federal agencies, including federal prosecutors,
enjoyed almost unlimited access to them. 102 Congress, however, discontinued
(daily ed. Mar. 11, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Nunn); Letter from Kevin D. Rooney, Ass't Att'y
Gen. for Admin., to Allen R. Voss (Nov. 13, 1978), reprinted in Comptroller General's Report,
supra note 76, at 54. This information is used "more often for investigative purposes than for
trial." Id. at 52.
96. Letter from Kevin D. Rooney, Ass't Att'y Gen. for Admin., to Allen R. Voss (Nov. 13,
1978), reprinted in Comptroller General's Report, supra note 76, at 54 n.3; see Speech by Steven
C. Underwood, Ass't Att'y Gen., Wis. Dep't of Justice, in Committee on the Office of Attorney
General, The National Association of Attorneys General, Combatting Organized Crime 43 (1978).
97. Letter from Kevin D. Rooney, Ass't Att'y Gen. for Admin., to Allen R. Voss (Nov.
13, 1978), reprinted in Comptroller General's Report, supra note 76, at 54 n.3.
98. House Hearings, supra note 1, at 28 (statement of Richard L. Thornburgh).
99. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
100. House Hearings, supra note 1, at 29 (statement of Richard L. Thornburgh). Another
problem is the added expense and delay occasioned by the government's reliance on alternative
sources. Id. at 28-29; see note 85 supra and accompanying text.
101. Administrative Report, supra note 16, at 849.
102. See Senate Report, supra note 1, at 317, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 3746-47; General Explanation, supra note 1, at 314, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. at 327-28;
Administrative Report, supra note 16, at 827-1023. Prior to its amendment in 1976, IRC
§ 6103 provided that tax returns and tax return information were public records that could be
disclosed either upon order of the President or under rules and regulations provided by the Secretary
of the Treasury and approved by the President. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 14(b),
39 Stat. 756 (1916) (current version at I.R.C. § 6103(a)). This loosely drawn statute resulted in
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this practice when it enacted the 1976 Tax Reform Act, 03 substantially
revising the IRC section that governs tax return confidentiality. 04 In amend-
ing the statute, Congress sought to balance the government's need for
information against the taxpayer's right to privacy and the government's
interest in maintaining the effectiveness of the federal voluntary self-
assessment tax system.1°5
Section 6103 of the IRC now provides that tax returns and tax return
information may not be disclosed except as specifically provided in the
statute. 10 6 For example, disclosure is authorized to congressional commit-
widespread dissemination of tax returns and return information by the IRS. Administrative Report,
supra note 16, at 829.
103. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
104. Id. § 1202 (codified at I.R.C. § 6103).
105. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 318, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
3747; General Explanation, supra note 1, at 315, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. at 327.
106. I.R.C. § 6103(a). For a general discussion of the 1976 Tax Reform Act's changes with
respect to tax return confidentiality, see Senate Report, supra note 1, at 315-49, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3744-78; General Explanation, supra note 1, at 313-45,
reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. at 325-57; Benedict & Lupert. Federal Income Tax Returns-The
Tension Between Government Access and Confidentiality, 64 Cornell L. Rev. 940 (1979); Corey,
Confidentiality of Tax Returns, in 2 New York University, Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth
Institute on Federal Taxation 1265 (N. Liakas ed. 1978). Although there is some authority to
the contrary, see United Motion Theatre Co. v. Ealand, 199 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1952) (per
curiam); Austin v. Aluminum Co. of America, 15 F.R.D. 490 (E.D. Tenn. 1954); Maddox v.
Wright, 103 F. Supp. 400 (D.D.C. 1952); O'Connell v. Olsen & Ugelstadt, 10 F.R.D. 142 (N.D.
Ohio 1949); Peterson v. Peterson, 70 S.D. 385, 17 N.W.2d 920 (1945), it is well settled that § 6103
does not create a testimonial privilege for federal income tax returns. See, e.g., Heathman v.
United States Dist. Court, 503 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1974); Shaver v. Yacht Outward Bound,
71 F.R.D. 561, 563 (N.D. I1. 1976); Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Krueger, 55 F.R.D. 512,
514 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Kingsley v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 20 F.R.D. 156, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
Tollefsen v. Phillips, 16 F.R.D. 348, 349 (D. Mass. 1954); 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2019, at 162-63 (1970). Moreover, it is clear that the Tax Reform Act of
1976 was not intended to effect any changes in this area. Payne v. Howard, 75 F.R.D. 465, 469
n.4 (D.D.C. 1977); Senate Report, supra note 1, at 330, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 3759; see General Explanation, supra note 1, at 325, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. at
337. Although § 6103 precludes an order compelling the IF.S to produce a copy of the retur In
court, Heathman v. United States Dist. Court, 503 F.2d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1974); Tollefsen v.
Phillips, 16 F.R.D. 348, 349 (D. Mass. 1954); 8 J. Wigmore, supra note 11, § 2377(f), at 781-82,
the courts have the power to compel the taxpayer to obtain a copy of his return from the IRS.
Kingsley v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 20 F.R.D. 156, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Reeves v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 80 F. Supp. 107, 109 (D. Del. 1948). The federal courts, however, have
recognized the confidential nature of tax returns and have broadly construed § 6103 to embody a
general federal policy against the indiscriminate disclosure of tax returns from any source. See
Payne v. Howard, 75 F.R.D. 465, 469-70 (D.D.C. 1977); Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v.
Krueger, 55 F.R.D. 512, 514 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Wiesenberger v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D.
556, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Kingsley v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 20 F.R.D. 156, 158 (S.D.N.Y.
1957). Thus, they have been loathe to compel the production of federal income tax returns unless
the litigant himself tendered an issue as to the amount of his income, see, e.g., Premium Serv.
Corp. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 511 F.2d 225, 229 (9th Cir. 1975); Payne v. Howard, 75
F.R.D. 465, 469-70 (D.D.C. 1977); Shaver v. Yacht Outward Bound 71 F.R.D. 561, 563
(N.D. Ill. 1976); Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Krueger, 55 F.R.D. 512, 514 (N.D. Ill. 1972);
Wiesenberger v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 35 F.R.D. 556, 557-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Kingsley v.
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tees, 10 7 to the President or his designated employees, 108 to certain federal
officers and employees for the purpose of administering the tax laws, 10 9 to
state tax officials, °10 and to certain federal agencies for statistical purposes. I'
More important, although section 6103 expressly permits disclosure of tax-
payer return information to officers and employees of a federal agency for use
in federal nontax criminal investigations or judicial proceedings, it limits the
opportunities for such disclosure. 11
2
The proposed use of tax return information in nontax criminal investiga-
tions and proceedings was the most controversial issue surrounding the Tax
Reform Act. 11 3 The proponents of such use, most notably the Justice Depart-
ment, contended that tax return information is essential to combat white
collar crime, organized crime, public corruption, and narcotics trafficking. 114
The opponents, on the other hand, were concerned with the effect that
disclosure would have on individual privacy, 1 s and the functioning of the
federal tax system. 116 In balancing these competing interests, Congress con-
Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 20 F.R.D. 156, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), or unless access to the returns is
essential because relevant information is not available from other sources. See, e.g., Payne v.
Howard, 75 F.R.D. 465, 470 (D.D.C. 1977); Shaver v. Yacht Outward Bound, 71 F.R.D. 561,
564 (N.D. I]M. 1976). See generally 2 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, supra note 6S, § 202, at 438-44.
107. I.R.C. § 6103(f). Disclosure is authorized to the three congressional committees that
oversee the IRS, id. § 6103(f)(1), to the chief of staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, id. §
6103(f)(2), and to nontax committees. Id. § 6103(f)(3).
108. Id. § 6103(g)(1). The statute specifically authorizes disclosure of the tax return of an
individual designated for possible appointment to a federal office by the President. Id.
§ 6103(g)(2).
109. Id. § 6103(h). The term "tax administration" is defined as "the administration, manage-
ment, conduct, direction, and supervision of the execution and application of the internal revenue
laws or related statutes ... [and] the development and formulation of Federal tax policy relating
to existing or proposed internal revenue laws, [and] includes assessment, collection, enforcement,
litigation, publication, and statistical gathering functions under such laws [or] statutes." Id.
§ 6103(b)(4).
110. Id. § 6103(d). The disclosure of federal income tax returns to any stale agency, body or
commission that is charged with the administration of the state tax laws is authorized only for the
purpose of tax administration. Id. For the corresponding state provisions, see note 27 supra and
accompanying text.
111. I.R.C. § 6103(j). For example, this subsection authorizes the disclosure of tax returns to
the Bureau of the Census, the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the Commerce Department, and
the Federal Trade Commission for statistical use. Id. § 6103 (j)(1), (2).
112. Id. § 6103(i).
113. Corey, supra note 106, at 1288; see Tax Reform Act of 1975: Hearings on H.R. 10612
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 100 (1976) (statement of William E.
Simon, Secretary of the Treasury) ("the principle area of contention seems to relate to the use of
tax data in nontax law enforcement investigations and court proceedings").
114. See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
115. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 317, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
3747; General Explanation, supra note 1, at 314, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. at 326; see, e.g., Senate
Hearings, supra note 1, at 236 (statement of Randolph Thrower); Senate Hearings 11, supra note 3,
at 1-2 (1976) (statement of Hope Eastman).
116. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 317, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
3747; General Explanation, supra note 1, at 314, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. at 326; see, e.g.,
Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 200 (statement of Sen. Weicker).
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cluded that "the information that the American citizen is compelled by our tax
laws to disclose to the Internal Revenue Service [is] entitled to essentially the
same degree of privacy as those private papers maintained in his home." '"
Thus, Congress amended section 6103(i) to accommodate both the interest in
the taxpayer's privacy and the legitimate need for the information to enforce
nontax criminal laws. 1 8
Unlike other subsections of section 6103, subsection (i) distinguishes be-
tween "return information" and "information from [the] taxpayer." Return
information, the information generally protected by section 6103, is any
information collected by the IRS, without regard to the source. 119 This
information can be disclosed by the IRS, upon a written request by the head
of a federal agency, for use in a nontax criminal investigation. 120 Moreover, if
the IRS discovers evidence of a possible nontax criminal violation, it may
disclose that information, in writing, to the head of the appropriate federal
law enforcement agency. 121
Conversely, information from the taxpayer is information supplied to the
IRS by, or on behalf of, the taxpayer.1 22 Any disclosure of this information
for the purpose of enforcing nontax criminal laws must be preceded by an ex
parte order.123 If the IRS discovers evidence of a possible nontax criminal
117. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 328, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
3757.
118. I.R.C. j 6103(i)(1)(A). Prior to the effective date of the amendment, the Justice
Department was authorized to receive tax return information for use in nontax criminal
proceedings when it was "necessary in the performance of . . . official duties." Former Treas.
Reg. 301.6103(a)-l(g), T.D. 7266, 1973-1 C.B. 593. Federal prosecutors were required to make an
application in writing and show: the name and address of the person for whom the return was
made; the kind of tax involved; the taxable period covered by the return; and the reason why
inspection was desired. Id. The requirement that reasons for the inspection be stated was "largely
a charade." Administrative Report, supra note 16, at 859. Thus, federal prosecutors could obtain
tax return information by routine requests to the IRS. United States v. Praetorius, 451 F. Supp.
371, 372-73 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); see, e.g., United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937 (1958); United States v. Tucker, 316 F. Supp. 822, 826 (D. Conn.
1970). Consequently, before the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the Justice Department was the largest
user of tax returns on an individual case-by-case basis, as opposed to a "mass" basis for statistical
use. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 317, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
3746; see Administrative Report, supra note 16, at 831.
119. I.R.C. § 6103(b).
120. Id. § 6103(i)(2). The request must include "(A) the name and address of the taxpayer
with respect to whom such return information relates; (B) the taxable period or periods to which
the return information relates; (C) the statutory authority under which the proceeding or
investigation is being conducted; and (D) the specific reason or reasons why such disclosure Is or
may be material to the proceeding or investigation." Id.
121. Id. § 6103(i)(3).
122. Id. § 6103(b)(3). It is clear that this definition is intended to encompass information
supplied by the taxpayer during an audit or in response to an administrative summons. Corey,
supra note 106, at 1271-72; see General Explanation, supra note 1, at 316, reprinted in 1976-3
C.B. at 328. Moreover, this definition has been interpreted as encompassing corporate records,
bank records, agent interviews, and Federal Bureau of Investigation information. 126 Cong. Rec.
S2379 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1980).
123. I.R.C. § 6103(i)(1). The temporary regulations make an exception to the ex parte order
requirement when there is a joint tax and nontax-related investigation. The court proceeding Is
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violation, it may not sua sponte disclose that information to another federal
agency.1 24 To obtain the information, the head of the interested federal
agency125 must apply to a district court judge for an order that will only be
granted upon a showing that:
(i) there is reasonable cause to believe, based upon information believed to be
reliable, that a specific criminal act has been committed;
(ii) there is reason to believe that such return or return information is probative
evidence of a matter in issue related to the commission of such criminal act; and
(iii) the information sought to be disclosed cannot reasonably be obtained from any
other source, unless it is determined that, notwithstanding the reasonable availability
of the information from another source, the return or return information sought
constitutes the most probative evidence of a matter in issue relating to the commission
of such criminal act.' 26
Despite Congress' attempt to strike a balance between competing interests,
section 6103(i) has been the subject of an ongoing controversy. Two proposed
amendments to this section have been introduced in Congress. The House
bill, which incorporates recommendations of the Privacy Protection Study
Commission, 12 7 proposes changes that would increase the protections ac-
corded to the taxpayer's privacy.' 28 The Senate bill, on the other hand, the
result of hearings held by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investiga-
tions,' 29 proposes amendments that would increase access to tax return
information by federal law enforcement agencies.' 30 To analyze the effects of
these proposed amendments on section 6103(i), and on tax return
confidentiality in general, three distinct elements should be considered: (1) the
information protected, (2) the character of the required court proceeding, and
(3) the showing that must be made to obtain the court order.
not required when the nontax matter arises out of the same factors and circumstances giving rise
to the tax investigation or proceeding. The proceeding must be authorized as a proceeding
involving tax administration at the request of the IRS, and, if the tax portion of the joint
proceedings is terminated for any reason, the Department of Justice attorney working on the
nontax portion must obtain a court order prior to further use of the returns. Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 404.6103(h)(2)-1(aX2), T.D. 7550, 1978-2 C.B. 322-23. The Justice Department has called this
regulation "cumbersome and inefficient [but] helpful" as a vehicle for coordination of nontax
cases with tax investigations. Letter from Kevin D. Rooney, Ass't Att'y Gen. for Admin., to Allen
R. Voss (Nov. 13, 1978), reprinted in Comptroller General's Report, supra note 76, at 51, 56. The
Privacy Protection Study Commission, on the other hand, has criticized this measure as an "easy
way to avoid the Tax Reform Act's restrictions on the disclosure of tax data for non-tax criminal
law enforcement." Privacy Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information
Society 557-58 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Privacy Report].
124. I.R-C. § 6103(i)(3).
125. In the case of the Justice Department, the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney
General, or any Assistant Attorney General may authorize the application. Id. § 6103(i(I)(B).
126. Id.
127. See Privacy Report, supra note 123, at 553-65.
128. H.R_ 354, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (on file with the Fordiam Law Review) (presently
pending before the House Ways and Means Committee).
129. See 126 Cong. Rec. S2374 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Nunn).
130. This bill, S. 2402, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 Cong. Rec. S2377-28 (daily ed. Mar. 11,
1980), was introduced before the Senate on January 3, 1980 by Sens. Nunn, Percy, Chiles,
Cohen, DeConcini, Long, Talmadge and Ribicoff.
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The controversy surrounding the information protected stems from the
distinction drawn by the present section between return information and
information from the taxpayer. 13 1 The House bill proposes that this distinc-
tion be eliminated, thus requiring a court order to disclose any information
obtained by the IRS. 132 The Senate bill would narrow the scope of the
information protected. The latter proposal would distinguish "return
information"-information required by law to be filed with the IRS133-from.
"nonreturn information"-all other information obtained by the IRS.13 4 The
express purpose of this amendment is to eliminate the increased protection
accorded to corporate records, bank records, agent interviews, and FBI
information under the present scheme.' 35
The proponents of the Senate bill are concerned primarily with the pros-
ecutorial need for the information to investigate nontax criminal viola-
tions. 136 They contend that the taxpayer's privacy would be adequately
protected if the proposed amendment were adopted, notwithstanding the
decrease in the amount of information accorded heightened protection. 137 The
Senate proposal, as well as the present statute, is apparently grounded on the
theory that information in the hands of someone other than the taxpayer
cannot be confidential.138 This rationale, however, fails to acknowledge that
"[c]oncerns about invasions of personal privacy are not synonomous [sic] with
Fifth Amendment protections.' 39 Although there is generally no constitu-
tional protection accorded records in the hands of third parties, 40 records
131. See notes 119-26 supra and accompanying text.
132. H.R. 354, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a) (1979) (on file with the Fordham Law Review ); see
Privacy Report, supra note 123, at 560-564. See also Benedict & Lupert, supra note 106, at 961.
133. S. 2402, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2, 126 Cong. Rec. S2377 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1980).
Under the Senate bill, any disclosure of return information would have to be authorized by a
court order. Id. § 7(i)(1), 126 Cong. Rec. at $2377; see 126 Cong. Rec. S2375-76 (daily ed. Mar.
11, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Nunn).
134. S. 2402, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3, 126 Cong. Rec. S.2377 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1980).
Under this bill, any disclosure of non-return information would be authorized upon a written
request by an attorney for the government. Id. § 7(i)(2)(A), 126 Cong. Rec. at S2377. The written
request must set forth the name and address of the taxpayer, the taxable periods to which the
information relates, and that the request is made in connection with an investigation that may
result in the enforcement of a specific criminal statute. Id. This requirement is similar to the
showing required under the present statute to obtain nonta.xpayer return information. See note
120 supra and accompanying text. Moreover, the Senate proposal would place an affirmative
burden on the IRS to notify the Justice Department whenever it uncovers evidence, other than
from a tax return, of a nontax criminal violation. S. 2402, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 7(i)(2Xb)(4), 126
Cong. Rec. at S2377; see 126 Cong. Rec. S2375-76 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1980) (remarks of Sen.
Nunn).
135. 126 Cong. Rec. S2379 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1980) (comparison of present federal
confidentiality statute with Senate bill); see note 122 supra and accompanying text.
136. See 126 Cong. Rec. S2374-76 (remarks of Sen. Nunn), S2386-88 (remarks of Sen. Percy),
S2388-89 (remarks of Sen. Chiles), S2389 (remarks of Sen. Cohen) (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1980).
137. 126 Cong. Rec. S2375 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Nunn).
138. See Privacy Report, supra note 123, at 556, 563.
139. Id. at 563.
140. Neither the fourth amendment nor the fifth amendment protects records in the possession
of third parties. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 99 S. Ct. 2577 (1979) (phone company records of
defendant~s phone calls were not protected by the fourth amendment); United States v. Miller,
1276 [Vol. 48
1980] TAX RETURN CONFIDENTIALITY 1277
such as credit card and banks files can often reveal the personal affairs of the
taxpayer.14 1 Moreover, third party records are usually not maintained at the
taxpayer's option. Often, the third party is required by law to keep the
records open for the IRS's inspection. 142 Other third party records are
obtained through the IRS's summons power and thus are not willingly
relinquished to the IRS. 143 Thus, regardless of the source, records obtained by
the IRS should be accorded an equivalent degree of privacy.
The second element to be considered is the character of the court proceed-
ing. The present federal statute, which requires an ex parte proceeding, 144
contemplates an in camera inspection of the returns by a district court
judge. 145 Although the House bill proposes that the proceedings be adversa-
rial, 146 the ex parte nature of the proceeding appears fully justified. To afford
the taxpayer an opportunity to contest the disclosure of his tax returns would
hinder law enforcement efforts 147 and result in two major disadvantages.
First, the taxpayer would be put on notice that he was being investigated,
thus giving him the opportunity to obstruct the investigation.'4 8 Second, an
adversarial proceeding would result in needless delays. 14 9 Because the tax-
payer's privacy interest is adequately protected by the requirement that an
425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (fourth amendment does not protect records maintained by defendant's
bank); Fischer v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 414 (1976) (taxpayer could not claim fifth
amendment privilege as to accountant's workpapers which the taxpayer had delivered to his
attorney); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 336 (1973) (taxpayer could not assert fifth
amendment privilege as to papers he had turned over to his accountant).
141. Privacy Report, supra note 123, at 556; see note 83 supra and accompanying text.
142. Privacy Report, supra note 123, at 556.
143. Id.
144. See notes 122-26 supra and accompanying text.
145. United States v. Praetorious, 451 F. Supp. 371 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); see Senate Report,
supra note 1, at 329, reprinted in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3758; General
Explanation, supra note 1, at 324, reprinted in 1976-3 C.B., at 336. The Justice Department
expressed its fears that the added requirement of obtaining the court order would result in costly
administrative delays, especially in light of the requirement that an in camera review be made.
Letter from Kevin D. Rooney, Ass't Att'y Gen. for Admin., to Allen R. Voss (Nov. 13, 1978),
reprinted in Comptroller General's Report, supra note 76, at 51, 54-55. To alleviate such costly
delays, the Senate bill proposes that the court be required to act on the application for an ex parte
order within five days of receipt. S. 2402, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 7(i)(1)(C). 126 Cong. Rec. S2377
daily ed. Mar. 11, 1980. The ex parte procedure does not, however, require the judge to subject
himself to defense counsel's examination "as to the facts on which he based an order to disclose
tax returns, or his rationale therefor." United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 146 (2d Cir. 1979),
petition for cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3179 (U.S. Aug. 17, 1979) (No. 79-261).
146. H.R. 354, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(b) (1979) (on file with the Fordham Low Review); see
Privacy Report, supra note 123, at 553-57.
147. Privacy Report, supra note 123, at 5S5.
148. Cf. House Hearings, supra note 1, at 29 (statement of Richard L. Thornburgh) (one of
the major disadvantages of using alternative sources of information rather than tax returns is that
the subject is alerted, giving him the opportunity "to destroy [relevant] evidence, obstruct the
investigation, or otherwise escape prosecution"); see note 100 supra and accompanying text.
149. The administrative delays are already a major disadvantage of the ex parte procedure.
See note 145 supra. To add a requirement that a taxpayer be given notice and an opportunity to
represent himself could only add to those delays.
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impartial party rule on the request for the information after inspecting the
returns in camera,150 an adversarial proceeding is not justified on grounds of
fairness. Consequently, the ex parte procedure strikes a proper balance
between the government's need for the information, and the taxpayer's right
to privacy.
The final disputed element is the nature of the showing the government
agency must make to gain access to the information. Under the present
statute, the government must demonstrate that there is "reasonable cause" to
believe that a specific criminal act has been committed, that the tax return is
probative of a matter in issue, and that the return cannot reasonably be
obtained from another source.151 The House bill proposes, instead, that the
reasonable cause standard be replaced with a "probable cause" standard.' 5 2
The reasonable cause standard, however, is the better approach. 53 When
investigating organized or white collar crime, public corruption and narcotics
trafficking, law enforcement authorities often are unaware of a specific
criminal act that has been committed.' 5 4 Thus, a showing of probable cause
would be virtually impossible to meet.155 Consequently, investigators would
be deprived of information necessary to even pursue an investigation.
Furthermore, the present requirement that the information be relevant to a
specific criminal act'5 6 is unwarranted. The more realistic approach taken by
the Senate bill, given the nature of the investigations in which tax return
information is useful,15 7 would require a demonstration that the information
is needed for an investigation which may result in the "enforcement of a
150. See notes 122-26 supra and accompanying text.
151. See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
152. H.R. 354, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(b) (1979) (on file with the Fordham Law Review);
see Privacy Report, supra note 123, at 553-57. Another proposal would establish a two-tier
procedure. "Initially, the government would have to prove probable cause in an ex parte
proceeding." Benedict & Lupert, supra note 106, at 960 n.120. If the government could not meet
that burden, however, notice would be given to the taxpayer and at a second, contested hearing
the government's burden would be reduced to "reasonable cause." Id. Other commentators,
however, believe that the "reasonable cause" standard sufficiently protects the taxpayer's privacy.
Comptroller General's Report, supra note 76, at 23; Benedict & Lupert, supra note 106, at 958-60.
153. "Probable cause . . . exists where the facts and circumstances within the affiant's
knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient unto them-
selves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or Is being
committed." Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967). The reasonable cause standard Is an
intentionally lesser standard than probable cause. Senate Report, supra note 1, at 328, reprinted
in [1976] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 3758. See generalky United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S.
606, 612-13 (1977) (reasonable cause standard interpreted as less stringent than the probable cause
standard). But see People v. Blackman, 81 Misc. 2d 12, 14, 364 N.Y.S.2d 704, 707 (Sup. Ct.
1975) (terms "reasonable cause" and "probable cause" used interchangably); People v. Lombardi,
18 A.D.2d 177, 180, 239 N.Y.S.2d 161, 164 (2d Dep't 1963) (per curiam) (same). The Privacy
Protection Study Commission has interpreted this standard to mean that there must be "some
basis to believe that a crime has been committed." Privacy Report, supra note 123, at 555.
154. See notes 96-97 supra and accompanying text.
155. 126 Cong. Rec. S2380 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1980) (comparison of present federal
confidentiality statute with Senate bill).
156. See note 122 supra and accompanying text.
157. See notes 96-100 supra and accompanying text.
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specifically designated federal criminal statute."' 5 8 Finally, the Senate bill
proposes to eliminate the third requirement of the present statute, that the
information be unavailable from another source. Is 9 This would also appear to
be justified. In most cases the requested information is available from another
source. Thus, it would normally be impossible to make the required show-
ing.1 60 The special problems associated with obtaining such information, 16 1
however, appear to justify the elimination of this requirement.
CONCLUSION
Although IRC section 6103(i) is not free from controversy, it has proven
that individual privacy and legitimate governmental needs can be successfully
balanced. By prohibiting nontax prosecutorial use of income tax returns,
many states have refused to strike that balance, with little appreciable gain to
the policies sought to be advanced. First, the state's interest in encouraging
candid self-reporting is merely speculatively and incidentally furthered . 62
Second, the state's interest in protecting individual privacy is at best margi-
nally served.163 Finally, the taxpayer's fifth amendment rights are not vio-
lated by such use. 164 Consequently, those states should follow the federal
example and attempt to achieve an acceptable balance between the policies
underlying the confidentiality statutes and the usefulness of tax return infor-
mation in investigating nontax criminal violations.
The federal statute, and the recent proposals to amend it,165 offer useful
guidelines that the states should' utilize in developing a statute that would
strike an equitable balance between the policies served by the confidentiality
statutes and the need for tax return information. For example, a state statute
should require an ex parte order for the disclosure of any tax return informa-
tion regardless of the source.' 66 This requirement, which calls for the judg-
ment of an impartial third party and prevents overzealous state prosecutors
from indiscriminately inspecting income tax returns, would sufficiently protect
a taxpayer's privacy. To ensure that state prosecutors have access to the
information when there is a legitimate need for it, however, they should
merely be required to show that there is reasonable cause to believe that the
information contained in the return is material and relevant to an investiga-
tion that may result in the enforcement of a specifically designated nontax
criminal statute. 167 In striking such a balance, the states will be taking an
158. S.2402, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 7(i)(1)(A)(i), 126 Cong. Rec. S2377 (daily ed. Mar. 11,
1980).
159. Id. § 7(i)(1)(A)(ii), 126 Cong. Rec. at S2377.
160. 126 Cong. Rec. S2380 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 1980) (comparison of present federal
confidentiality statute with Senate bill).
161. See notes 85, 99-100 supra and accompanying text.
162. See notes 67-81 supra and accompanying text.
163. See notes 82-85 supra and accompanying text.
164. See notes 86-94 supra and accompanying text.
165. The present statute and the House and Senate bills do not adequately balance the state's
interest in protecting privacy with the government's need for information. They do, however,
provide guidelines for a statute that would strike that balance.
166. See notes 131-43 supra and accompanying text.
167. See notes 144-61 supra and accompanying text.
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important step forward in their fight against crime, at little cost to individual
privacy.
David E. Joyce
